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Abstract
We analyse the economics and epidemiology of different scenarios for a phased restart
of the UK economy. Our economic model is designed to address the unique features of
the COVID-19 pandemic. Social distancing measures affect both supply and demand, and
input-output constraints play a key role in restricting economic output. Standard models for
production functions are not adequate to model the short-term effects of lockdown. A survey
of industry analysts conducted by IHS Markit allows us to evaluate which inputs for each
industry are absolutely necessary for production over a two month period. Our model also
includes inventory dynamics and feedback between unemployment and consumption. We
demonstrate that economic outcomes are very sensitive to the choice of production function,
show how supply constraints cause strong network effects, and find some counter-intuitive
effects, such as that reopening only a few industries can actually lower aggregate output.
Occupation-specific data and contact surveys allow us to estimate how different industries
affect the transmission rate of the disease. We investigate six different re-opening scenarios,
presenting our best estimates for the increase in R0 and the increase in GDP. Our results
suggest that there is a reasonable compromise that yields a relatively small increase in R0
and delivers a substantial boost in economic output. This corresponds to a situation in
which all non-consumer facing industries reopen, schools are open only for workers who
need childcare, and everyone who can work from home continues to work from home.
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1 Introduction
The social distancing measures imposed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic have created se-
vere disruptions to economic output. Governments throughout the world are contemplating or
implementing measures to ease social distancing and reopen the economy, which may involve
a tradeoff between increasing economic output vs. increasing the expected number of deaths
due to the pandemic. Here we investigate several scenarios for the phased reopening of the
economy. At one extreme, we find that reopening only a very limited number of industries
can create supply chain mis-coordination problems that in some cases might actually decrease
aggregate output. In contrast, reopening all industries would most likely increase R0 above 1.
We find a good scenario in-between these extremes: reopening a large part of the upstream
industries, while consumer-facing industries stay closed, limits supply chain mis-coordination
while providing a large boost to output and a relatively small increase in infection rates.
The shocks to the economy caused by social distancing are highly industry specific. Some
industries are nearly entirely shut down by lack of demand, others are restricted by lack of
labor, and many are largely unaffected. Feedback effects amplify the initial shocks. The lack
of demand for final goods such as restaurants or transportation propagates upstream, reducing
demand for the intermediate goods that supply these industries. Supply constraints due to lack
of labor under social distancing propagate downstream, by creating input scarcity that can limit
production even in cases where the availability of labor and demand would not have been an
issue. The resulting supply and demand constraints interact to create bottlenecks in production.
The resulting decreases in production may lead to unemployment, decreasing consumption and
causing additional amplification of shocks that further decrease final demand.
Understanding these effects requires a model at the level of individual industries. Most
of the economic analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic uses relatively aggregate macro models
(Eichenbaum et al. 2020, Bodenstein et al. 2020), with only a few studies predicting the economic
effects using input-output (IO) models. IO models are particularly relevant to evaluate the
consequences of crises such as COVID-19, where different sectors are affected differently, and
the propagation of shocks through supply chains is likely to amplify the initial effects. Table
1 summarizes the main features of several IO models that have been put forward recently to
evaluate the macroeconomic effects of the COVID-19 crisis. Our paper differs in a number
of important ways from the literature. On one hand, we provide comprehensive scenarios, an
estimation of the epidemic spreading, non-equilibrium dynamics, and explicit demand shocks
together with a sophisticated consumption response. On the other hand, we do not model
prices, as we argue that price changes during the lockdown are relatively small.
The most important conceptual difference that distinguishes our model is our treatment
of the production function, which dictates most of the behavior of the models listed in Table
1. Essentially, the literature can be ordered by the degree to which the production function
allows substitutions between inputs. At one extreme, the Leontief production function assumes
a fixed recipe for production, allowing no substitutions and restricting production based on
the limiting input (Inoue & Todo 2020). Under the Leontief production function, if a single
input is severely reduced, overall production will be reduced proportionately, even if that input
is ordinarily relatively small. This can lead to unrealistic behaviours. For example, the steel
industry has restaurants as an input, presumably because steel companies have a workplace
canteen and sometimes entertain their clients and employees. A literal application of the Leontief
production function would predict that a sharp drop in the output of the restaurant industry
will dramatically reduce steel output. This is unrealistic, particularly in the short run.
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Feature Inoue & Todo
(2020)
Barrot et al.
(2020)
Mandel &
Veetil (2020)
Fadinger
& Schymik
(2020)
Bonadio et al.
(2020)
Baqaee &
Farhi (2020)
This paper
Date 31 Mar 2 April 29 Apr April April 7 May May 22, 2020
Geographical
scope
Japan France +
some EU
countries
World Germany 64 countries US UK
Data/ aggreg.
level
1.67M firms INSEE 38 +
WIOD 54 sec-
tors
WIOD 55 sec-
tors
Eurostat 62
sectors
OECD 33 sec-
tors
BEA 66 sec-
tors
WIOD 55 sec-
tors
Production
function
Leontief CES CES CD CD nesting
CES
nested CES Leontief for
“critical in-
puts” + Lack
of non-critical
inputs does
not harm
output
Utility and/
or consump-
tion function
Fixed demand CES CES CD 2 nests CES CRS non
parametric
Linear
Supply shocks Essential ac-
tivities
WFH + Es-
sential indus-
tries + School
closures
Plausibility
considera-
tions from
Dorn et al.
(2020)
WFH WFH +
lockdown
stringency +
Essential for
Health only
WFH + some
share “not re-
moved”
WFH + Essen-
tial industries
Final demand
shocks
No No No No No Theory only Yes
Equilibrium No Yes Transient Yes Yes Yes No
Prices No Yes Yes, sticky Yes Yes Yes No
Inventories Inputs inven-
tories
No Output inven-
tories
No No No Inputs invento-
ries
Fiscal/ mone-
tary policy
No No No No No No Yes
Reopening
policy
Yes Individual in-
dustries
Yes (lockdown
lifted)
Individual in-
dustries
Yes, sym-
metric to
lockdown
No Yes, scenarios
Epidemic
spreading
No No No No No No Yes
Other Frictional in-
put shares ad-
justment; hys-
teresis in final
demand
Counter
factual for re-
nationalizing
supply chains
Productivity
shocks (the-
ory)
V-shape or
instantaneous
recovery con-
sumption
function
Table 1: Summary of features in IO papers modelling the effect of COVID-19 on the economy. WFH: Work From
Home. CD: Cobb Douglas. CES: Constant Elasticity of Substitution.
The alternatives used in the literature are the Cobb-Douglas production function (Fadinger
& Schymik 2020), which has an elasticity of substitution of 1, and the CES production function,
where typically calibration for short term analysis uses an elasticity of substitution less than
1 (Barrot et al. 2020, Mandel & Veetil 2020, Bonadio et al. 2020). Some papers (Baqaee &
Farhi 2020) consider a nested CES production function, which can accommodate a wide range
of technologies. In principle, nests could allow for substitution between some inputs and forbid
it between others, in different ways for different industries. However, it is hard to calibrate all
these elasticities, so that in practice many models end up using very limited nesting structure
or assuming uniform substitutability. Consider again our example of the steel industry. With
common calibrations of the (nested) CES production function, firms could substitute iron for
energy, while still producing the same output. To the extent that certain production processes
are encoded in fixed technological “recipes”, this is clearly unrealistic1.
We argue that modeling production during the COVID-19 crisis requires a new approach
to production functions, that is different from both standard Leontief and CES production
functions. In this paper, we mostly keep the basic Leontief assumption that firms cannot
substitute one input for another. However, we depart from the Leontief assumption in that we
1 Papers using CES production functions also assume equilibrium mechanisms for substitution and prices that
are not completely realistic for the short run dynamics in the current context. Consider again our restaurant
example. In an equilibrium model with a CES production function, if the output of restaurants is constrained, the
relative price of restaurants will immediately increase, and firms will choose a relatively lower level of restaurant
inputs, and a relatively higher level of other inputs. In the current context the closure of work canteens in steel
factories is not driven by increased prices but policy and it is not clear that it is affecting steel output, or that
it is substituted by other inputs.
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allow firms to keep producing as long as they have the inputs that are absolutely necessary,
which we call “critical inputs”. The steel industry cannot produce steel without iron and energy,
but it can operate for a considerable period of time without restaurants or logistics consultants.
Specifically, we make the assumption that if restaurants cannot supply the steel industry, the
steel industry simply keeps producing at the same rate. This is of course only an approximation.
To keep the same example, by not using restaurants, the costs of the steel industry are reduced
and, ceteris paribus, its profits increase. In reality, non-critical inputs may have an impact
on steel output that could be modeled as a shock to productivity. However, we think that
during the short time-scales of the pandemic, these problems are second-order effects, and our
production function provides a better assumption than Leontief or CES production functions.
In order to determine which inputs are critical and which are not, we use a survey that
IHS Markit performed at our request. In this survey they asked “Can production continue in
industry X if input Y is not available for two months?”. The list of possible industries X and
Y was drawn from the 55 industries in the World Input-Output Database. This question was
presented to 30 different industry analysts who were experts in industry X. Each of them was
asked to rate the importance of each of its inputs Y. They assigned a score of 1 if they believed
input Y is critical, 0 if it is not critical, and 0.5 if it is in-between, with the possibility of a rating
of NA if they could not make a judgement. We then apply the Leontief function to the list of
critical inputs, ignoring non-critical inputs. We experimented with several possible treatments
for industries with ratings of 0.5 and found that we get somewhat better empirical results by
treating them as non-critical (though at present we do not have sufficient evidence to resolve
this question unambiguously).
Besides the bespoke production function discussed above, we also introduce a COVID-
19-specific treatment of consumption. Most models do not incorporate the demand shocks
that are caused by changes in consumer preferences in order to minimize risk of infection.
The vast majority of the literature has focused on the ability to work from home, and some
studies incorporate lists of essential vs. inessential industries, but almost no papers have also
explicitly added shocks to consumer preferences. (Baqaee & Farhi (2020) is an exception, but
the treatment is only theoretical). Here we use the estimates from del Rio-Chanona et al.
(2020), which are taken from a prospective study by the Congressional Budget Office (2006).
These estimates are crude, but we are not aware of estimates that are any better. As we
write, data on actual consumption starts to become available; what we have seen so far is
qualitatively consistent with the shocks predicted by the CBO, with massive shocks to the
hospitality industry, travel and recreation, milder (but large) shocks elsewhere, and increased
expenses in groceries/food retail (Andersen et al. 2020, Carvalho et al. 2020, Chen et al. 2020).
Besides the initial shock, we also attempt to introduce realistic dynamics for recovery and
for savings. The shocks to on-site consumption industries are more long lasting, and savings
from the lack of consumption of specific goods and services during lockdown are only partially
reallocated to other expenses.
The first step in the analysis of our model is empirical validation: We compare model
predictions to the economic data that statistical agencies have started to disseminate. To
compare to UK data, we start the lockdown in our model on March 23rd, and keep it for two
months. For 2020Q1, we find a 1.7% reduction in GDP compared to 2019Q4, which is close
to the 2% early estimate recently released by the Office for National Statistics. For 2020Q2,
we forecast that GDP would be 21.5% lower than in 2019Q4, which is in the range of forecasts
provided by economic institutions and consulting firms. We also compare model predictions to
sectoral unemployment data, finding good agreement.
As a second step, we investigate some theoretical properties of the model. Our analysis
makes it clear that bottlenecks in supply chains can strongly suppress aggregate economic
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output. The extent to which this is true depends on the production function. These effects
are extremely strong with the Leontief production function, are much weaker with a linear
production function (which allows unrealistically strong substitutions) and have an intermediate
effect with our modified Leontief function. Network effects can strongly inhibit recovery, and
can cause counter-intuitive results, such as situations in which reopening a few industries can
actually depress economic output.
Our third step, which is the key aim of this paper, is to find a good compromise between
the economic benefit of reopening industries and negative health consequences of doing so. It
is worth keeping in mind that many health outcomes depend on the state of the economy, so
that keeping the economy closed also has negative health consequences.
The fundamental principles of epidemic spreading are relatively well understood, and it is
clear that social distancing measures reduce the spreading of COVID-19 (Jarvis et al. 2020,
Maier & Brockmann 2020, Arenas et al. 2020). The difficulty comes with obtaining good
estimates of the key parameters that govern the fate of an epidemic, and in particular, the
reproduction number R0, which gives the number of secondary cases for each primary case in
a largely unaffected population. If R0 is above one, the disease spreads to a given percentage
of the population, otherwise the epidemic dies out. In this paper, we side-track the problem of
developing a full-fledged epidemic spreading model, and focus on estimating R0. We decompose
the reproduction number into the infections caused by contacts during work, during consump-
tion, during public transport, and in other contexts, i.e. home and other social interactions.
We use recent contact survey data from Sweden to estimate the share of infection due to each
type of contact. For each industry we estimate its relative contribution to overall work and
consumption infections. For instance, the Health sector is responsible for more work-related
infections than the Forestry sector. This is because workers have more contacts, contacts are
more risky, and there are more Health workers than Forestry workers. As another example, the
Retail and Restaurant sectors contribute much more to consumption infections than the Mining
sector, because there are virtually no direct consumption activities in the Mining industry.
We estimate the epidemiological consequences of scenarios for coming out of lockdown. Lift-
ing the lockdown for a specific industry has several effects: workers of this industry contribute
to increased work-related infection; consumers of this industry (if any) contribute to increased
consumption-related infections; workers of this industry contribute to increased public transport
infections; and finally, children of these workers go back to school if the workers cannot work
from home, contributing to increased school-related infections. We assume in all the scenarios
that workers who can work from home continue working remotely.
We present a summary of our re-opening scenarios results in the next section. We then
present in detail our economic model and its calibration in Section 3. We show our model
predictions for the UK economy in Section 4 and discuss production network effects and re-
opening single industries in Section 5. We introduce the epidemic model and present effects of
re-starting the economy on infectious contagion in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 A sweet spot for partially reopening the economy with only
a minimal boost to the epidemic
Fig. 1 summarizes our bottom line results, presenting the trade-off between increasing economic
production and mitigating the spread of the pandemic under five different scenarios. The bars
on the left show estimates of R0 and the bars on the right show GDP as a percentage of the
pre-lockdown GDP. For comparison, pre-lockdown is shown on the left. The scenarios are:
keeping lockdown; opening Manufacturing and Construction (which is short for fully re-opening
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Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction); opening all industries except
consumer-facing industries; same, but additionally opening schools; and opening all industries.
We find that a two-month lockdown has a strong impact on the economy, with gross output,
value added, and consumption decreased by 26%, 25%, and 18%, respectively, compared to
the UK pre-lockdown levels. Compared to the economy’s performance before the lockdown, an
additional month of lockdown would decrease GDP from 75% to 74%, while re-opening only
the Manufacturing and Construction sectors would increase GDP from 75% to 76% in a month.
Re-opening all sectors except those that are consumer-facing would increase GDP to 82% of its
pre-lockdown value, i.e. in a month it would increase GDP by 8 percentage points with respect
to the lockdown scenario. Opening all industries only adds an additional 2% boost to GDP.
Note that the scenario with all industries open has only 84% of pre-lockdown GDP. This is due
to a combination of a persistent depression in demand for industries like restaurants (even if
they are open) and the fact that consumer expectations take time to recover.
Figure 1: How different policy scenarios affect R0 and economic output. The coloured bars show the
expected reproduction number of the epidemic for each policy scenario. Different colours designate the activities
that cause the epidemic to spread. The purple bars denote the percentage increase in value added relative to
lockdown a month after the economy is opened under each scenario. Black lines are two standard deviation error
bars. Note that we have normalized the infection rates for all scenarios so that they correspond to the Jarvis et al.
(2020) study during lockdown. (Our estimate during lockdown is roughly R0 ≈ 0.90; their estimate is 0.62; these
agree with the error bars). Note that Manufacturing and Construction also includes mining, agriculture, and a
few others.
A comparison to our predictions for the increase in R0 under each scenario shows that for
the scenario where all industries except consumer facing industries are opened, the increase in
R0 relative to lockdown is small. In contrast, as soon as schools are open R0 rises dramatically,
and is very likely greater than one. If the economy is fully reopened, the predicted rise in R0 is
very likely substantially greater than one. Note that when the economy is fully reopened we find
an R0 still disturbingly greater than one, although much lower than the pre-lockdown value,
as we assume that work from home continues and non-work related social distancing measures
continue. Another reason for this is that we renormalize all our epidemiological results by the
factor of 0.62/0.90, corresponding to the ratio of our original estimate to that of Jarvis et al.
(2020) for the lockdown situation, thus ensuring that our estimate for the lockdown scenario
corresponds to theirs. We did this because we feel that the relative values of our estimated R0
across different scenarios are more reliable than the absolute values, and we defer to professional
epidemiologists for estimating the absolute values. It is important to bear in mind that all
these values are uncertain, and the uncertainties potentially make the difference in determining
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whether there will be a second wave of the epidemic in the UK. We should also stress the
uncertainties in the economic results – as we will show here, they depend rather sensitively on
assumptions about the production function.
Thus, our results suggest that there is a “sweet spot”, corresponding to the scenario in which
all except consumer facing industries reopen, with schools remaining closed for the children of
parents who do not work or can work from home.2 This scenario provides a good combination
of a minimal predicted increase in R0 and a substantial economic boost over remaining in
lockdown.
The official UK government guidelines for COVID-19 recovery “Step one” (until June 1st)3
recommend that, in addition to sectors that were previously considered essential, manufacturing
and construction should reopen, but that consumer-facing industries such as hospitality and
non-essential retail should remain closed. Overall, this scenario corresponds to something in
between our second and third scenario, depending on whether sectors such as business services
fully reopen. By contrast, other countries (e.g. France) reopened personal services and non-
essential retail soon after lockdown was lifted, which would correspond to something between
our fourth and fifth scenario (depending on whether schools are open).
3 Economic Model
To analyse the economic benefits of staged re-opening we introduce a sectoral macroeconomic
model that was inspired by the work of Battiston et al. (2007), Hallegatte (2008), Henriet et al.
(2012) and Inoue & Todo (2019). We combine elements of these models and extend them
to include new features. Our model incorporates production network effects that can amplify
economic shocks both upstream and downstream.
In our model producers experience supply shocks caused by a nationwide lockdown. In the
lockdown workers in non-essential industries who are unable to work from home become unpro-
ductive, resulting in lowered productive capacities of industries. At the same time demand-side
shocks hit as consumers adjust their consumption preferences to avoid getting infected. We
use the first-order supply and demand shocks predicted by del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020) to
initialise our macro model.
Our model is open-source and can be downloaded together with all relevant data4. We also
provide an interactive online interface for our model, allowing the user to explore alternative
scenarios and parameter ranges5.
3.1 Timeline
A time step t in our economy corresponds to one day. There areN industries6, one representative
firm for each industry, and one representative household that owns the industries. Every day:
1. Firms hire or fire workers depending on whether their workforce was insufficient or redun-
dant to carry out production in the previous day.
2. The representative household decides its consumption demand and industries place orders
for intermediate goods.
2This understandably creates childcare problems and will require creative solutions, and our model is not
designed to account for the negative effects on health and future human capital that closed school can create.
3 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-plan-to-rebuild-the-uk-governments-covid-
19-recovery-strategy (accessed: 2020/05/21).
4 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3834116.
5 https://anton-pichler.shinyapps.io/UK_COVID-19_economic_simulator/
6 See Appendix G, Tables 12-13 for a comprehensive summary of notations used.
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Figure 2: Schematic model chronology.
3. Industries produce as much as they can to satisfy demand, given that they could be limited
by lack of critical inputs or lack of workers.
4. If industries do not produce enough, they distribute their production to final consumers
and other industries on a pro rata basis, that is, proportionally to demand.
5. Industries update their inventory levels, and profits and labor compensation are dis-
tributed to households.
The model is initialized at time t = 0 in the steady state corresponding to input data. We
apply the pandemic shocks on day tstart lockdown and keep the economy in lockdown until day
tend lockdown. At that point we remove the supply-side restrictions corresponding to the scenario.
Some consumption demand-side shocks remain in place until the pandemic is suppressed on day
tend pandemic. In our scenarios we do not lift shocks of other final demand shocks (investment,
international trade). Fig. 2 schematically displays the overall chronology of the model.
3.2 Accounting structure
Let xi,t denote total output of industry i at time t and Zji,t the intermediate consumption by
industry i of good j. Industry i is demand and j is supply. We adopt the standard convention
that in the input-output matrix columns represent demand and rows represent supply. In an
economy with no “excess” output, i.e. in which all produced output is used up, the output of i
is equal to
xi,t =
N∑
j=1
Zij,t + ci,t + fi,t, (1)
where ci,t is household consumption of good i at time step t and fi,t is all other (exogenous)
final demand, including government consumption and exports.
We let li,t denote labor compensation to workers in industry i. This also indicates the
number of workers employed in industry i, under the assumption that all workers employed in
the same industry earn the same wage. Profits of industry i can then be written as
pii,t = xi,t −
N∑
j=1
Zji,t − li,t − ei,t, (2)
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where ei,t represents all other expenses (taxes, imports, etc.). Note that we do not model
physical capital explicitly, and we take prices as time-invariant.
For total output, total labor income, total profits and total household consumption we write
x˜t ≡
N∑
i=1
xi,t, (3)
l˜t ≡
N∑
i=1
li,t, (4)
p˜it ≡
N∑
i=1
pii,t, (5)
c˜t ≡
N∑
i=1
ci,t, (6)
respectively. We focus on these four variables when discussing aggregate economic impacts of
the pandemic in subsequent sections.
Our analysis is based on the UK economy. We use the latest release of the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer et al. 2015) to determine the relevant values for gross output
xi,0, intermediate consumption Zij,0, household consumption ci,0, other final demand fi,0, labor
compensation li,0, and all other expenses ei,0 (2014 values). Overall, we can distinguish 55
separate industries.
3.3 Demand
It will become important to distinguish between demand, that is orders placed by customers to
suppliers, and actual realized transactions. All the steps outlined above are realized transactions,
which might or might not be equal to demand.
Industry demand. The total demand faced by industry i at time t, di,t, is the sum of the
demand from all its customers,
di,t =
N∑
j=1
Oij,t + c
d
i,t + f
d
i,t, (7)
where Oij,t (for orders) denotes the demand from industry j, c
d
i,t the demand from households
and fdi,t all other final demand.
Recipes. Industries produce output according to a production recipe encoded in the technical
coefficient matrix A, where the element Aij = Zij,0/xj,0 is the expense in input i per unit of
output j. We will relax the assumption of fixed production recipes, since not every input is
critical for production in the short-run (see Appendix C). Industries always demand and aim
to consume inputs according to their recipe, even if lacking non-critical inputs does not cause
immediate effects on its output in the short time horizon considered here.
Inventories. Due to the dynamic nature of the model, production and demand are not imme-
diate. Instead industries use an inventory of inputs in production. We let Sij,t denote the stock
of material i held in j’s inventory. Each industry j aims to keep a target inventory njZij,0 of
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every required input i to ensure production for nj further days
7. We explain how we calibrate
the parameters nj in Appendix B.
Intermediate demand. Intermediate demand follows the dynamics originally introduced by
Henriet et al. (2012) and adopted by Inoue & Todo (2019) in the context of firm-level production
network models. To satisfy incoming demand (from t − 1) and to reduce the gap to its target
inventory, an industry j makes orders to its suppliers at every time step t. More specifically,
industry j demands from industry i
Oij,t = Aijdj,t−1 +
1
τ
[njZij,0 − Sij,t], (8)
where τ indicates how quickly an industry adjusts its demand due to an inventory gap. Small
τ corresponds to responsive industries that aim to close inventory gaps quickly. In contrast, if
τ is large, intermediate demand adjusts slowly in response to inventory gaps. In the literature
we find different choices for τ , ranging from 1 (Henriet et al. 2012) to 30 (Hallegatte 2012) time
steps. In our simulations, we choose an intermediate value τ = 10. We present sensitivity tests
with respect to τ in Appendix D.4.
Consumption demand. We let consumption demand for good i be
cdi,t = θi,tc˜
d
t , (9)
where θi,t is a preference coefficient, giving the share of goods from industry i out of total
consumption demand c˜dt . The coefficients θi,t evolve exogenously, following assumptions on how
consumer preferences change during the various phases of the pandemic; see Section 3.5, Eq.
(25).
Total consumption demand evolves following an adapted and simplified version of the con-
sumption function in Muellbauer (2020). In particular, c˜dt evolves according to
log c˜dt = ρ log c˜
d
t−1 +
1− ρ
2
log
(
ml˜t
)
+
1− ρ
2
log
(
ml˜pt
)
+ ˜t, (10)
where l˜t is current labor income, l˜
p
t is an estimation of permanent income and m is the share of
labor income that is used to consume final domestic goods, i.e. that is neither saved nor used for
consumption of imported goods. From our data we find m = 0.82. Consumption demand during
the pandemic is affected by a change of permanent income expectations and the exogenous shock
term ˜t; see Section 3.5, Eqs. (22) and (24). The parameter ρ indicates sluggish adjustment
to new consumption levels. Assuming that a time step corresponds to a quarter, Muellbauer
(2020) takes ρ = 0.6, implying that more than 70% of adjustment to new consumption levels
occurs within two and a half quarters. We modify ρ to account for our daily timescale: By
letting ρ¯ = 0.6, we take ρ = 1− (1− ρ¯)/90 to obtain the same time adjustment as in Muellbauer
(2020)8. Note that, in the steady state, by definition permanent income corresponds to current
income, i.e. l˜pt = l˜t, and thus total consumption demand corresponds to ml˜t.
9
7 Considering an input-specific target inventory would require generalizing nj to a matrix with elements nij ,
which is easy in our computational framework but difficult to calibrate empirically.
8 In an autoregressive process like the one in Eq. (10), about 70% of adjustment to new levels occurs in a
time ι related inversely to the persistency parameter ρ. Letting Q denote the quarterly timescale considered by
Muellbauer (2020), time to adjustment ιQ is given by ιQ = 1/(1− ρ¯). Since we want to keep approximately the
same time to adjustment considering a daily time scale, we fix ιD = 90ιQ. We then obtain the parameter ρ in
the daily timescale such that it yields ιD as time to adjustment, namely 1/(1 − ρ) = ιD = 90ιQ = 90/(1 − ρ¯).
Rearranging gives the formula that relates ρ and ρ¯.
9 To see this, note that in the steady state c˜dt = c˜
d
t−1. Moving the consumption terms on the left hand side
and dividing by 1− ρ throughout yields log c˜dt = log
(
ml˜t
)
+ ˜t. With no exogenous shock, we find c˜
d
t = ml˜t.
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To test robustness, we present model results for alternative consumption functions in Ap-
pendix D.4. We find that our simulations are highly robust against alternative consumption
models.
Other components of final demand. In addition, an industry i also faces demand fdi,t from
sources that we do not model as endogenous variables in our framework, such as government
or industries in foreign countries. fdi,t is not affected by the dynamics of the model. We discuss
the composition and calibration of fdi,t in detail in Section 3.5.
3.4 Supply
Every industry aims to satisfy incoming demand by producing the required amount of output.
Production is subject to the following two economic constraints:
Productive capacity. First, an industry has finite production capacity xcapi,t , depending on
the amount of available labor input. Initially every industry employs li,0 of labor and produces
at full capacity xcapi,0 = xi,0. We assume that productive capacity depends linearly on labor
inputs,
xcapi,t =
li,t
li,0
xcapi,0 . (11)
Input bottlenecks. Second, the production of an industry might be constrained due to an
insufficient supply of critical inputs. This can be caused by production network disruptions.
While the empirical intermediate consumption at the initial time step is embodied in the tech-
nical coefficient matrix A, not every input is necessarily critical for production. Modeling the
severeness of intermediate input constraints realistically requires an understanding of how crit-
ical inputs are in the production of a given industry (Barrot & Sauvagnat 2016).
We use the ratings of IHS Markit analysts to differentiate three types of inputs: critical,
important and non-critical inputs (Appendix C). If an industry runs out of critical inputs,
economic production halts immediately. Conversely, if an industry runs out of non-critical
inputs, we assume that economic production is not affected. We also have ratings on important
but not critical inputs. As a baseline we treat important inputs as non-critical. In Section 5.1
we investigate in detail how alternative assumptions on the input-production relationship affect
economic impacts.
For a given set of inputs if there are no limits on production capacities, industry i can
produce
xinpi,t = min
j∈Vi
{
Sji,t
Aji
}
, (12)
where Vi is the set of critical suppliers to industry i. If every input is critical, every input is
binding, and this reduces to a Leontief production function.
Output level choice and input usage. Since an industry aims to satisfy incoming demand
within its production constraints, realized production at time step t is
xi,t = min{xcapi,t , xinpi,t , di,t}. (13)
Thus production level of an industry is constrained by the smallest of three values: labor-
constrained production capacity xcapi,t , intermediate input-constrained production capacity x
inp
i,t ,
or total demand di,t.
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The level of output then determines the actual use of inputs according to the production
recipe. Industry i uses an amount Ajixi,t of input j, unless j is not critical and the amount of j
in i’s inventory is less than Ajixi,t. In this case, the quantity consumed of input j by industry
i is equal to the remaining inventory stock of j-inputs Sji,t < Ajixi,t.
Rationing. Without any adverse shocks, industries are always able to meet total demand,
i.e. xt = dt. But in case of production capacity or/and input bottlenecks, industries may not
be able to meet total demand, xi,t < di,t, so they need to ration their output. We assume
simple proportional rationing, although alternative rationing mechanisms could be considered
(e.g. Inoue & Todo (2019)).
The final delivery from industry i to industry j then is the share of orders received
Zij,t = Oij,t
xi,t
di,t
. (14)
Households receive a share of their demand
ci,t = c
d
i,t
xi,t
di,t
, (15)
and the realized final consumption of agents with exogenous final demand is
fi,t = f
d
i,t
xi,t
di,t
. (16)
Inventory updating. The inventory of j for every input i is updated according to
Sij,t+1 = min {Sij,t + Zij,t −Aijxj,t, 0} . (17)
In a Leontief production function, where every input is critical, the minimum operator would not
be needed since production could never continue once inventories are run down. It is necessary
here, since when inventories of non-critical inputs i are depleted, industry j produces output
using less goods i than Aijxj,t.
Hiring and firing. Firms adjust their labor force depending on which production constraints
in Eq. (13) are binding. If the capacity constraint xcapi,t is binding, industry i decides to hire
as many workers as necessary to make the capacity constraint no longer binding. Conversely, if
either input constraints xinpi,t or demand constraints di,t are binding, industry i lays off workers
until capacity constraints become binding. More formally, at time t labor demand by industry
i is given by ldi,t = li,t−1 + ∆li,t, with
∆li,t =
li,0
xi,0
[
min{xinpi,t , di,t} − xcapi,t
]
. (18)
Note that the term li,0/xi,0 reflects the assumption that the labor share in production is constant
over the considered period. We assume frictions in the labor market in a sense that it takes
time for firms to adjust their labor inputs. Specifically, we assume that industries can increase
their labor force only by a fraction γH in direction of their target. Similarly, industries can
decrease their labor force only by a fraction γF in the direction of their target. In the absence
of additional policies we usually have γF > γH, indicating that it is easier for firms to lay off
employed than hire new workers. Industry-specific employment evolves then according to
li,t =
{
li,t−1 + γH∆li,t if ∆li,t ≥ 0,
li,t−1 + γF∆li,t if ∆li,t < 0.
(19)
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As we discuss further in Section 3.6, γH and γF can be interpreted as policy variables. For
example, the implementation of a furloughing scheme makes re-hiring of employees easier, cor-
responding to an increase in γH. In our baseline simulations we choose γH = 1/30 and γF = 2γH.
Given our daily time scale, this is a rather rapid adjustment of the labor force. We present
sensitivity tests for these parameters in Appendix D.4.
3.5 Pandemic shock
Timeline The simulation starts in the steady state. For simplicity we let the pandemic shock
hit at the same time as the lockdown starts, i.e. we do not take into account reduced demand
beforehand. We let the lockdown last for two months (60 time units), and then lift it according
to the specifications below.
Supply shocks At every time step during the lockdown an industry i experiences an (ex-
ogenous) first-order labor supply shock Si,t ∈ [0, 1] that quantifies labor reductions. These
reductions are caused by the lack of labor that was previously provided by workers in non-
essential industries (del Rio-Chanona et al. 2020, Fana et al. 2020, Galasso 2020) who cannot
work remotely (del Rio-Chanona et al. 2020, Dingel & Neiman 2020, Gottlieb et al. 2020,
Koren & Peto˝ 2020). For instance, if an industry is non-essential, and none of its employ-
ees can work from home, it faces a labor supply reduction of 100% during lockdown i.e.,
Si,t = 1, ∀t ∈ [tstart lockdown, tend lockdown). Instead, if an industry is classified as fully essen-
tial, it faces no labor supply shock and Si,t = 0 ∀t.
Letting li,0 be the initial labor supply before the lockdown, the maximum amount of labor
available to industry i at time t is given as
lmaxi,t = (1− Si,t)li,0. (20)
If Si,t > 0, the productive capacity of industry i will be smaller than in the initial state of the
economy. We assume that the reduction of total output is proportional to the loss of labor. In
that case the productive capacity of industry i at time t is
xcapi,t =
li,t
li,0
xcapi,0 ≤ (1− Si,t)xi,0. (21)
Recall from Section 3.4 that firms can hire and fire to adjust their productive capacity to demand
and supply constraints. Thus, productive capacity can be lower than the initial supply shock.
However, during lockdown they can never hire more than (1− Si,t)li,0 workers. If the lockdown
is unwound for an industry i, first-order supply shocks are removed, i.e. we set Si,t = 0, for
t ≥ tend lockdown.
Supply shock calibration To initialise the economic model with first-order supply shocks
from the pandemic we use the shock predictions of the recent study by del Rio-Chanona et al.
(2020). In del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020) supply shocks of the pandemic are derived by quantify-
ing which work activities of different occupations can be performed from home (Remote-Labor-
Index) and by using the occupational compositions of industries. Moreover, the predictions also
take into account whether an industry is essential in the sense that it needs to continue operat-
ing during a lockdown. The predictions of first-order shocks are based on the US economy using
a different industrial classification system. These predictions therefore need to be adopted for
the UK economy and the WIOD industry classification as we outline in detail in Appendix A.
For the UK we estimate that 67% of the work force has an essential job. However, much of
this essential work can be done remotely (e.g. government and financial services). In total we
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estimate that 44% of workers can work remotely and that 37% of workers are currently going
to work, assuming that people work from home whenever possible.
Consumption demand shocks A first shock to consumption demand occurs through reduc-
tions in current income and expectations for permanent income. Expectations for permanent
income depend on whether households expect a V-shaped vs. L-shaped recovery, that is, whether
they expect that the economy will quickly bounce back to normal or there will be a prolonged
recession. Let expectations for permanent income l˜pt be specified by
l˜pt = ξt l˜0 (22)
In this equation, the parameter ξt captures the fraction of pre-pandemic labor income l˜0 that
households expect to retain in the long run. We first give a formula for ξt and then explain the
various cases.
ξt =

1, t < tstart lockdown,
ξL = 1− 12
l˜0−l˜tstart lockdown
l˜0
, tstart lockdown ≤ t ≤ tend lockdown,
1− ρ+ ρξt−1 + νt−1, t > tend lockdown.
(23)
Before lockdown, we let ξt ≡ 1. During lockdown, following Muellbauer (2020) we assume that
ξt is equal to one minus half the relative reduction in labor income that households experience
due to the direct labor supply shock, and denote that value by ξL. (For example, given a
relative reduction in labor income of 16%, ξL = 0.92.)10 After lockdown, we assume that 50%
of households believe in a V-shaped recovery, while 50% believe in an L-shaped recovery. We
model these expectations by letting ξt evolve according to an autoregressive process of order
one, where the shock term νt is a permanent shock that reflects beliefs in an L-shaped recovery.
With 50% of households believing in such a recovery pattern, it is νt ≡ −(1− ρ)(1− ξL)/2.11
In addition to the income effect, during a pandemic consumption/saving decisions and con-
sumer preferences over the consumption basket are changing, leading to first-order demand
shocks (Congressional Budget Office 2006, del Rio-Chanona et al. 2020). For example, con-
sumers are likely to demand less services from the hospitality industry, even if it is able to
supply these services. Transport is very likely to face substantial demand reductions, despite
being classified as an essential industry in many countries. A key question is whether reductions
in demand for “risky” goods and services is compensated by an increase in demand for other
goods and services, or if lower demand for risky goods translates into higher savings.
We consider a demand shock vector t, whose components i,t are the relative changes in
demand for goods of industry i. These components evolve in the various phases of the pandemic,
10During lockdown, labor income may be further reduced due to firing. For simplicity, we choose not to model
the effect of these further firings on permanent income.
11The specification in Eq. (23) reflects the following assumptions: (i) time to adjustment is the same as
for consumption demand, Eq. (10); (ii) absent permanent shocks, νt = 0 after some t, ξt returns to one, i.e.
permanent income matches current income; (iii) with 50% households believing in an L-shaped recovery, ξt
reaches a steady state given by 1− (1− ξL)/2: with ξL = 0.92 as in the example above, ξt reaches a steady state
at 0.96, so that permanent income remains stuck four percentage points below pre-lockdown current income.
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as defined in the following equations:
i,t =

0, if t < tstart lockdown,
Di , if tstart lockdown ≤ t < tend lockdown,
0, if no on-site consumption of i &
t ≥ tend lockdown,
Di
log 100 log
(
100− 99ttend pandemic
)
, if on-site consumption of i &
tend lockdown ≤ t < tend pandemic,
0, if t ≥ tend pandemic.
(24)
We use the estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (2006), del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020),
which we denote by Di , to parameterize i,t during lockdown. Roughly speaking, these shocks
are massive for restaurants and transport, mild for manufacturing, null for utilities, and positive
for health (see Appendix A).
When the lockdown is lifted, demand shocks for industries that do not involve on-site con-
sumption are removed; in contrast, demand for industries that involve on-site consumption
(restaurants, theatres, etc.)12 goes back to normal more slowly, and in a non-linear way. The
specification in Eq. (24) captures the idea that demand for on-site consumption industries is
likely to resume very slowly after lockdown and to accelerate towards its pre-pandemic level as
the pandemic approaches an end (or at least is perceived to come to a conclusion).13 Recent ev-
idence from transaction data in China (Chen et al. 2020) backs the assumption that demand for
these industries resumes more slowly than for industries that do not face on-site consumption.
An illustration for three industries that either do not experience any demand shock, experience
a demand shock only during lockdown or experience a demand shock throughout the pandemic
is given in Fig. 3.
We now explain how the demand shock vector affects consumption demand. Recall from
Eq. (9), cdi,t = θi,tc˜
d
t , that consumption demand is the product of the total consumption scalar
c˜dt and the preference vector θt, whose components θi,t represent the share of total demand for
good i. We initialize the preference vector by considering the initial consumption shares, that is
θi,0 = ci,0/
∑
j cj,0. By definition, the initial preference vector θ0 sums to one, and we keep this
normalization at all following time steps. To do so, we consider an auxiliary preference vector
θ¯t, whose components θ¯i,t are obtained by applying the shock vector i,t. That is, we define
θ¯i,t = θi,0(1− i,t) and define θi,t as
θi,t =
θ¯i,t∑
j θ¯j,t
=
(1− i,t)θi,0∑
j(1− j,t)θj,0
. (25)
The difference 1−∑i θ¯i,t is the aggregate reduction in consumption demand due to the de-
mand shock, which would lead to an equivalent increase in the saving rate. However, households
may not want to save all the money that they are not spending. For example, they most likely
want to spend on food the money that they are saving on restaurants. Therefore, we define the
12 For deciding whether an industry faces on-site consumption we use the same list that we compiled for the
epidemic model, supplementing it with industries that are not very infectious collectively, but that individually
could be perceived as risky. For example, infections while buying a car are a negligible share of all infections,
but visiting a car seller might be perceived as risky. Specifically, we classify as industries involving on-site
consumption those with the following codes: G45, G47, H49, H50, H51, H52, H53, I, L68, M69 M70, O84, P85,
R S, T.
13 Note that the specification in Eq. (24) also allows for a small bump in consumption demand at the time the
lockdown is lifted.
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Figure 3: Illustration of demand shocks. Electricity (blue line) does not experience any demand shock; paper
manufacturing (green line) only experiences a moderate demand shock during lockdown; restaurants (red line)
experience a strong demand shock during lockdown, and then the demand shock remains persistent in the initial
phase of reopening, disappearing only as the end of the pandemic approaches.
aggregate demand shock ˜t in Eq. (10) as
˜t = ∆s
(
1−
N∑
i=1
θ¯i,t
)
(1− ρ), (26)
where ∆s is the change in the savings rate. When ∆s = 1, households save all the money
that they are not planning to spend on industries affected by demand shocks; when ∆s = 0,
they spend all that money on goods and services from industries that are affected less. For our
simulations, we take an intermediate value ∆s = 0.5. Finally, the term (1 − ρ) is needed to
account for the autoregressive process in Eq. (10).14
Demand shock calibration. Note that WIOD distinguishes five types of final demand:
(I) Final consumption expenditure by households, (II) Final consumption expenditure by non-
profit organisations serving households, (III) Final consumption expenditure by government (IV)
Gross fixed capital formation and (V) Changes in inventories and valuables. Additionally, all
final demand variables are available for every country. The endogenous consumption variable
ci,0 corresponds to (I), but only for domestic consumption. All other final demand categories,
including all types of exports, are absorbed into fi,0.
We apply different initial shocks to the different demand categories presented above. For do-
mestic final demand variables we assume the following initial shocks: We use the estimates from
Congressional Budget Office (2006) and del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020) to calibrate the consump-
tion demand shock variable Di which we apply to the final consumption variables (I) and (II).
We assume that investment (IV) is reduced by 5.6%, in line with the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) estimates for the reduction in investment in the US from 2019Q4 to 2020Q1.
We do not apply any exogenous shocks to categories (III) Final consumption expenditure by
government and (V) Changes in inventories and valuables.
14If ˜t was constant, in the steady state log c˜
d
t would be reduced by ∆s
(
1−∑Ni=1 θ¯i,t).
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To initialise the model with foreign demand shocks, we use the recent estimates on trade
by the World Trade Organisation. In their recent forecast international trade is predicted to
decline between 12-33% for European countries (Bekkers et al. 2020). We follow the pessimistic
scenario of the WTO and assume a drop of 33% in foreign intermediate and final demand.
A summary of all shocks is provided in Appendix A, Table 5. There is considerable uncer-
tainty in our estimates of first-order demand shocks, which we aim to reduce in the future by
collecting additional data. However, sensitivity tests shown in Appendix D.1 suggest that our
model predictions are fairly robust against uncertainties in the shock estimates.
3.6 Policy intervention
An exogenous policymaker – the government – can influence economic outcomes in three possible
ways. First, the key policy which we are considering is the implementation and withdrawal
of a lockdown. While the implementation of a lockdown affects all industries simultaneously
according to the exogenous first-order supply and demand shocks, the lockdown can be unwound
for different sets of industries. We experiment with different re-opening scenarios which we also
evaluate with respect to their impact on infectious contagion (Section 6).
Second, the government can also pay out additional social benefits to workers to compensate
income losses. During the pandemic only a fraction of the initial labor force is employed, due
both to direct shocks and subsequent firing/furloughing, resulting in lower labor compensation,
i.e. l˜t < l˜0, for t ≥ tstart lockdown. The government can reimburse a fraction b of the income loss
l˜t − l˜0 as social benefits, increasing disposable income of households to
l˜∗t = l˜t + b(l˜0 − l˜t). (27)
Following the current UK policy on furloughing, we set b = 0.8 in our default simulations.
As a third policy dimension we consider labor force adjustment parameters γH and γF.
Recall from Eq. (19) that the larger these parameters, the quicker firms can adjust their labor
inputs. Hiring and firing of employees can be costly without further support by the government.
We assume that a furloughing policy scheme increases the flexibility of adding and removing
labor inputs to an industry.
We explore in a somewhat stylized way the effect of furloughing on the economy by varying
parameters b, γH and γL. Setting these parameters to larger values represents a regime where
furloughing is encouraged by the government, whereas smaller values indicate the business-as-
usual scenario without furloughing.
4 Economic impact of COVID-19 on the UK economy
We now show results of the economic model and compare model predictions to data. We focus
on the baseline calibration discussed above. For convenience all model parameters are reported
again in Table 2.
We let the model start in the steady state at the beginning of 2020. The economy rests in
steady state until March 23rd, at which point we apply the pandemic shock. For this simulation
we assume that lockdown lasts two months, until May 23rd, at which point all supply-side
restrictions are unwound. We show this specific scenario for illustration purposes, while we
consider other reopening scenarios in Sections 5.3 and 6.5. We let the model run for another
month and a half, until the end of June, to analyse its recovery path. We do not run the
model further in the future, both because of the great uncertainties involved and because our
assumptions on non-critical inputs are only valid for a limited time span.
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Table 2: Parameters of the economic model for our baseline simulations.
Name Symbol Value
Consumption function Eq. (10)
Production function Eqs. (11)-(13)
Inventory adjustment τ 10
Upward labor adjustment γH 1/30
Downward labor adjustment γF 1/15
Consumption adjustment ρ 0.987
Government benefits b 0.8
Change in savings rate ∆s 0.5
Fig. 4 shows model results for production (gross output); results for other important vari-
ables, such as profits, consumption and labor compensation (net of government benefits) are
similar. When the lockdown starts, there is a sudden drop in economic activity, shown by a
sharp decrease in production. A second smaller drop in production occurs at the beginning
of April, due to some service sectors further reducing production. Throughout the simulation,
however, service sectors tend to perform better than manufacturing, trade, transport and ac-
commodation sectors. The main reason is that most service sectors face both lower supply
and demand shocks, as a high share of workers can effectively work from home, and there is
no on-site consumption for most business and professional services. In fact, consumption even
increases for several industries (consumption of health is an example).
When the lockdown is lifted, the economy starts approaching its previous level, but this is
not all achieved by the end of June. While some sectors quickly return close to pre-lockdown
levels, recovery for other sectors is much slower. For example, Restaurants and Transport
(green lines) recover very slowly, due to the assumption that consumers are cautious towards
industries that involve on-site consumption (see Section 3.5 and Fig. 3). The aggregate level
of consumption also does not return to pre-lockdown levels, due to a reduction in expectations
of permanent income associated with beliefs in an L-shaped recovery (Section 3.3), and due to
the fact that we do not remove shocks to investment and exports (see Section 3.5).
Considering both the lockdown period and the post-lockdown partial recovery, our forecast
for GDP in the second quarter of 2020 compared to the last quarter of 2019 is -21.5%. This
estimate is more pessimistic than the majority of forecasts for the UK economy done by economic
institutions and consulting firms,15 which, on average, are around -15%. However, it is more
optimistic than the estimate by the Bank of England, which predicts a -25% reduction in
aggregate GDP.16
To test how realistic the results of our model are we compare as many model predictions to
data as possible. For aggregate data, we focus on the UK, also considering Spain, France, and
Italy.
The UK recently released early estimates of national accounts in the first quarter of 2020.17
Because lockdown started in the UK only on March 23, the impact on the UK economy over all
the first quarter was modest. Indeed, GDP reduced by about 2%, and consumption decreased
by 1.7%. Running our model until the end of March, we find a GDP reduction of 1.7% and
15https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/data-forecasts
16See the monetary policy report of May 2020 (https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/
monetary-policy-report/2020/may/monetary-policy-report-may-2020), section 2 “Current economic condi-
tions”.
17https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpfirstquarterlyestimateuk/
januarytomarch2020
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Figure 4: Economic production as a function of time. We plot production (gross output) as a function
of time for each of the 55 industries. Aggregate production is a thick black line and each sector is colored.
Agricultural and industrial sectors are colored red; trade, transport, and restaurants are colored green; service
sectors are colored blue. All sectoral productions are normalized to their pre-lockdown levels, and each line size
is proportional to the steady-state gross output of the corresponding sector.
a consumption reduction of 1.3%. Labor compensation actually increased in the UK by 0.8%,
while in our model it decreased by 0.3%. While data for labor compensation are probably
not affected by only a week of lockdown, it is interesting that both in data and in our model
consumption decreased more than income, a peculiar feature of this pandemic-induced recession
(Muellbauer 2020).
Spain, France, and Italy have reported a larger effect. Remarkably, recently released data
from statistical offices reveals that all these countries expect a decline in GDP of around 5% in
2020-Q1, which is substantially larger than the 2% reduction in the UK. Since this is mostly
due to these countries starting widespread lockdowns between one and two weeks earlier than
the UK, we rerun our model starting lockdown on March 15. In this case, we find that quarterly
GDP decreases by 3.3%. This is somewhat off the 5% mark, but part of the error probably
comes from the fact that we calibrate our model on UK data (e.g. IO tables), and we assume no
reduction in GDP at all before March 15 (in contrast to the evidence of disruptions in supply
chains, reduced international travel and early reaction by some consumers prior to this date).
So far, we considered testing data aggregated at the national level, and only pertaining at
most to the first 15 days of lockdown. However, we want to test the predictions of our model at
a detailed sectoral level, and also explore how our model fares deeper into the lockdown period.
The best sectoral data that we could find were released by the States of Washington and Texas,
which released weekly unemployment claims data at a high level of industrial disaggregation.
In particular, Washington released data up to 6-digit NAICS, while Texas released data for 17
broad industries.18 To compare with the predictions of our model, we make the hypothesis that
18We had to clean the data imputing some missing information and to do a crosswalk from NAICS to WIOD
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Figure 5: Comparison of model predictions to data. In both panels, on both axes, we show the ratio
between employment 42 (Washington) or 35 (Texas) days after the shock and employment before the shock.
Dots are scaled according to employment shares. The dots labels refer to industry codes, see Appendix for the
corresponding names. The identity line is shown for reference.
relative reductions in employment across different sectors are similar in the UK as in Washington
and Texas; for example, restaurant workers are more likely to be fired or furloughed than workers
in food manufacturing in all these places. We consider unemployment claims from March 14
through April 25 for Washington, and through April 18 for Texas. While March 14 was not
the official start of lockdown for either State, unemployment claims started to spike during that
week, making it the ideal starting point to compare the predictions of our model to data. To
run the model for the same time span as the data, we run it for 42 days after imposing lockdown
to compare to Washington data, and for 35 days for Texas data.
Figure 5 shows the ratio of employment levels on April 25 to employment levels on March
14, both in the model and in the Washington data, across all sectors. The Pearson correlation
between the model’s predictions and the data is 0.44, and the correlation weighted by the
employment share of each sector is 0.66. This indicates that predictions for the largest sectors are
more accurate. In most cases the model somewhat overestimates the reduction in employment.
However, in a few cases employment reduction is actually underestimated, for example in health
(Q, large dot on the right).
Comparison with Texas data yields similar results, except that in this case the model vastly
overestimates the number of firings. However, correlations are higher in this case, as the Pearson
correlation coefficient is 0.68 and the weighted correlation coefficient is 0.72.
We perform the same comparison between model predictions and empirical data for alter-
native specifications in Appendix D.5. Considering all sensitivity cases studied in Appendix D,
the correlation coefficients listed above are very robust. The only exception is the case in which
we consider a Leontief production function, where the correlation between model predictions
and data even becomes negative. The correlation is also low if we consider important inputs as
critical or half-critical.
Overall, we take both the aggregate and sectoral results as an indication that the outcomes
of the model are in good qualitative agreement with the reality. There remains some significant
quantitative differences, but also a substantial margin for improvement as we have not fitted
many parameters, demand shocks can be improved, and we have to compare a UK model to
state-level US data. We also take the result as a clear indication that the Leontief production
function produces predictions at odds with empirical data, supporting our modeling choice of
considering non-critical inputs.
sector. Details are available upon request.
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5 Supply, demand and network effects
5.1 Production and input criticality
A key innovation of our model is that it uses a production function that distinguishes between
critical and non-critical inputs, based on the IHS Markit analyst ratings. To better understand
how different assumptions on input criticality influence outcomes, we implemented various spec-
ifications.
The most rigid case is the Leontief production function, in which every positive entry in the
technical coefficient matrix A is a binding input to an industry, reducing “input bottlenecks”,
Eq. (12), to
xinpi,t = min{j: Aji>0}
{
Sji,t
Aji
}
, (28)
In this case an industry would halt production immediately if inventories of any input are run
down, even for small and potentially negligible inputs .
At the other extreme, we implement a linear production function for which all inputs are
perfectly substitutable. Here, production in an industry can still continue if inputs cannot
be provided, as long as there is sufficient supply of alternative inputs. Thus, there is no input
bottlenecks for individual inputs, however, production can be constrained if the input inventories
are insufficient. In this case we have
xinpi,t =
∑
j Sji,t∑
j Aji
. (29)
Note that intermediate inputs are perfectly substitutable in this case, but a lack of labor supply
cannot be compensated by other inputs.
We also implemented three different production function specifications based on the criti-
cality ratings of IHS Markit analysts. Recall that we define critical inputs as those that were
rated 1, non critical those that were rated 0, and important those that were rated 0.5. First,
we use the baseline production function of the main text where we set all input ratings of 0.5
equal to 0 (this makes them non-critical inputs). Second, we set all 0.5 input ratings equal to
1 to make them critical inputs. This moves us closer to the Leontief production function. As a
third case, we implement the specification where an industry’s production scales proportionally
to the 0.5 rating of important inputs. Thus, we have
xinpi,t = min{∀j∈Vi, ∀k∈Ui}
{
Sji,t
Aji
,
1
2
(
Ski,t
Aki
+ xcapi,0
)}
, (30)
where Vi is the set of critical inputs and Ui is the set of important inputs to industry i. This
means that if an important input goes down by 50% compared to initial levels, production of
the industry would decrease by 25%. In case the stock of this input is fully depleted, production
drops to 50% of initial levels.
In Fig. 6 we show simulation results on total production x˜t, labor compensation l˜t, profits
p˜it and household consumption c˜t; Eq. (3)-(6). Note that value added is the sum of profits and
labor compensation. In the simulation, tstart lockdown = 2,
19 and there is no re-opening in the
following six months (180 days).
As expected we find the largest drop for all economic variables for the Leontief produc-
tion function, where every input can potentially become binding (black line). For the Leontief
19Choosing a time step for applying the pandemic shock is arbitrary, as the model rests in steady state
beforehand. In Section 4 we chose March 23rd as the starting date of lockdown to easily compare to UK quarterly
data, in the following we apply the pandemic shock at t = 2, with no loss in generality.
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economy our model predicts roughly a 70% drop in gross output, consumption and labor com-
pensation over the next six months if the lockdown continues.
Again in line with intuition, we obtain the mildest economic impacts for the linear production
function (blue). There is still a substantial drop in all variables due to first-order shocks, but
little further adjustment resulting from network effects.
The production function specifications using the results of the IHS Markit survey lie some-
where in between these two extremes. Treating all important inputs as critical also yields a
severe drop in economic production and all other variables (green). The red line indicates the
scenario where all important inputs are considered to be non-critical, which is the baseline
specification of our model. The results for this case are more similar to the linear production
function, although slightly more severe due to the higher risk of lacking critical inputs. Treating
important inputs as half-critical such that output scales with the inputs by the factor of 1/2 is
the ‘median’ scenario in these simulations, as indicated by the orange line.
In Appendix D.3 we show the recovery paths after re-opening the entire economy. Although
the production functions can yield substantially different economic impacts in lockdown, they
converge in the long-run after the economy is re-opened.
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 50 100 150
Days
G
ro
ss
 o
ut
pu
t (n
orm
a
liz
e
d)
Linear
important = 0
important = 1/2
important = 1
Leontief
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 50 100 150
Days
R
ea
liz
e
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
(no
rm
a
liz
e
d)
Linear
important = 0
important = 1/2
important = 1
Leontief
0.0
0.5
1.0
0 50 100 150
Days
Pr
of
its
 (n
orm
a
liz
e
d)
Linear
important = 0
important = 1/2
important = 1
Leontief
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 50 100 150
Days
La
bo
r c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
(no
rm
a
liz
e
d) Linear
important = 0
important = 1/2
important = 1
Leontief
Figure 6: Comparison of production functions for indefinite lockdown. Total output, realized consump-
tion, profits and labor compensation for five production function specifications after the lockdown is imposed
at t = 2 (dashed vertical line). All values are normalized to the initial no-lockdown steady state and there
is no re-opening of industries. Linear (blue) denotes a linear production. The red line represents the baseline
production function with all important (0.5) inputs being set to be non-critical. The orange line is the case where
production scales with a factor of 1/2 with important inputs. The green line (important=1) is the case where
all important inputs are treated as critical. The black line the Leontief production function where all inputs are
critical.
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5.2 First-order shocks, shock propagation and total impact
Our model is initialised with the first-order supply and demand shocks discussed in Section 3.5
and simulates how the economic system translates these shocks into overall economic impacts.
Recall that exogenous supply shocks lead to an immediate reduction in gross output. We let
the direct output shock be
OSdirecti ≡
xshockedi,0 − xi,0
xi,0
=
(1− Si,0)xi,0 − xi,0
xi,0
= −Si,0, (31)
which is equivalent to first-order supply shocks. Similarly, exogenous demand shocks instanta-
neously decrease final consumption. More formally, we define direct final consumption shocks
as
CSdirecti ≡
cshockedi,0 + f
shocked
i,0 − ci,0 − fi,0
ci,0 + fi,0
. (32)
The upper panel of Fig. 7 visualises for each sector of the UK economy the reduction in gross
output OSdirecti and final consumption CS
direct
i as a result of first-order shocks. While some
industries such as Forestry and Logging (A02) face larger immediate reductions in gross output
than final consumption, transport industries (H49-51) experience much larger negative shocks
in final consumption. Reductions in both final consumption and gross output are enormous for
Accommodation and Food Service Activities (I).
We also quantify higher-order impacts on gross output (supply-side) and final consumption
(demand-side). These indirect effects are time-dependent since overall economic performance
changes in time as can be seen from the simulations above. Note that higher-order impacts
in gross output do not necessarily need to be caused by supply-side shocks but could also
result from a lack of demand. Conversely, final consumption reductions can stem from lowered
production levels. We let the total output shock at any time denote
OStotali,t = xi,t/xi,0 − 1.
The indirect output shock is then computed as the residual of the total output shock OStotali,t
and direct output shock OSdirecti . Thus, for the indirect output shock we have
OSindirecti,t = OS
total
i,t −OSdirecti . (33)
Similarly, we compute indirect final consumption shocks as
CSindirecti,t = CS
total
i,t − CSdirecti , (34)
where CStotali,t = (ci,t + fi,t)/(ci,0 + fi,0)− 1 is the overall final consumption shock.
The center panel of Fig. 7 shows a scatter plot where the x-axis denotes direct output
shocks OSdirecti and the y-axis indirect output shocks OS
direct
i,t for t = 60, i.e. two months into
lockdown. Points scatter in an inverted L-shape indicating that industries that experience large
direct output shocks do not reduce production much more in the course of the lockdown. In
contrast, many industries that experience little or no direct shocks to their productive capacities
downsize economic production substantially after two months.
The bottom panel of Fig. 7 is the same but for final consumption instead of output. Although
similar patterns can be observed, there are also a few larger differences. For the majority of in-
dustries there are less extreme direct and indirect effects on final consumption. These industries
thus lie closer to the identity line. While all higher-order supply-side effects are non-positive,
almost half of the industries face positive higher-order consumption effects, although they tend
23
to be very small. Note that the vast majority (92%) still face negative total consumption ef-
fects. Positive values on the y-axis indicate that higher-order impacts on final consumption are
slightly mitigating initial shocks. For example, Transport and Warehousing industries (H49-52)
are substantially hit by direct demand shocks. The total impact after two months of lockdown
is somewhat below these levels.
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Figure 7: Upper panel: Sectoral first-order shocks in the UK economy on the supply and demand sides.
The axes give %-reductions in gross output (y-axis) and in final consumption (x-axis). A blue disk indicates that
the monetary shock in absolute terms is larger on the supply side than on the demand side (blue disks can thus
lie above the identity line and vice versa). Disk size corresponds to initial gross output of industries. Details on
the shocks and industry labels can be found in Appendix A, Table 5. Center panel: Comparison of direct
and indirect output shocks. Direct supply shocks shown as reduction in sectoral output (x-axis) plotted
against indirect impacts on sectoral production (y-axis). Industries that face a large initial supply shock tend to
experience smaller higher-order impacts, while higher-order effects can be large for industries that experienced
little or no initial supply shock. Bottom panel: Comparison of direct and indirect final consumption
shocks. Direct final demand shocks (x-axis) plotted against indirect impacts on final demand (y-axis). Disk size
corresponds to initial level of final demand satisfied per industry.
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We also used our first-order shocks to calibrate simpler traditional input-output models
(see Miller & Blair (2009) for an excellent overview). We show in Appendix D.6 that under
much simplified model parametrizations we can recover the classic Leontief model and get
similar sectoral predictions as the Gosh model in steady state. The problem with these models
is that they are not able to take supply and demand shocks into account at the same time.
While alternative IO models such as the mixed endogenous/exogenous model (Dietzenbacher &
Miller 2015) can be used with simultaneous supply and demand constraints, the model does not
necessarily yield feasible solutions corresponding to positive output and consumption values.
This is indeed what we find for the UK economy. Calibrating the mixed endogenous/exogenous
IO model to our first-order shocks results in infeasible economic allocations.
We now demonstrate how the first-order shocks shown in Fig. 7 are amplified through the
production network and how they affect overall economic impact. To evaluate the relative con-
tributions of supply and demand shocks to overall outcomes, we run the following simulations:
First, we run the baseline model setup where both initial supply and demand shocks are present
as discussed above. Second, we run the model considering only supply shocks, i.e. we set all
consumer demand shocks to zero, Di = 0, as well as remove all shocks to other final demand
categories, i.e. fdi,t = f
d
i,0
As a third simulation scenario we run the model with all initial supply shocks switched off
and include only initial demand shocks.
Fig. 8 shows four key macroeconomic variables (total output x˜t, consumption c˜t, profits p˜it
and labor compensation l˜t) for all three simulation scenarios, both when lockdown continues
(solid lines) and when the lockdown is lifted for all industries after 60 days (dashed lines). In
Appendix D.2, we run the same simulations for alternative production functions. It becomes
clear that demand shocks lead to much smaller economic impacts than supply shocks (blue vs.
red solid lines). On the other hand, we find that the economy recovers much quicker after the
lockdown if there are no demand shocks, as indicated by the large positive slope of the red
dashed line. When there are only demand shocks, recovery is slow. In this case unwinding
the economy from lockdown brings limited positive effects due to persistence in exports and
investment shocks, sluggish consumption adaptation and a portion of consumers believing in
an L-shaped recovery.
Strikingly, we observe that overall negative economic impact in lockdown is larger if the
model economy faces only supply shocks instead of being exposed to supply and demand shocks
simultaneously (red vs. black solid line). If demand shocks are absent, total output lies roughly
5% below the baseline scenario where both types of shocks are present, except for the first eleven
days.
Why is it that turning off demand shocks leads to larger adverse overall impacts? The
reason is that in case of large supply constraints and no reduction in final demand, there is
higher competition for relatively few goods. If producers cannot satisfy aggregate demand, they
need to ration their output to customers (recall that we use proportional rationing). In case
of large aggregate demand every customer receives only a relatively small share, which could
be even less for some industries compared to the scenario where demand shocks are turned
on. If these goods are critical inputs, production in concerned industries will come down once
inventories of these inputs are run down. Thus, removing demand shocks can increase the risk of
input bottlenecks in production. Put simply, decreasing final demand of some key intermediate
goods ensures continued supply of these intermediate goods to other intermediate industries.
In the particular case considered here, it turns out that several large industries have to
reduce production as a consequence of fierce competition for critical inputs, as can be seen in
Fig. 9 a). Without demand shocks industries such as Health (Q), Education (P85), Real Estate
(L68) or IT (J62-3) produce up to 25% less when compared to the baseline case two weeks
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after lockdown. Although several other industries such as Manufacturing Chemicals (C20) and
Pharmaceuticals (C21) produce substantially more without demand shocks, this does not offset
the overall adverse effect on the economy as a whole. This can be thought of as a coordination
failure.
To better understand how this happens we zoom into the first 15 days of Fig. 8 a). As
an illustrative example in Fig. 9 b), we show how production constraints in Manufacturing
Electronic (C26) lead to larger input bottlenecks in IT (J62-3) in the absence of initial demand
shocks. There is no difference in Manufacturing Electronic production (black line) for both
scenarios due to binding capacity constraints, but it faces larger aggregate demand if there are
no demand shocks (blue crosses) compared to both shocks being present (red crosses). Thus,
sector IT for which Manufacturing Electronic goods are critical inputs has to run down its input
inventories quicker if there are no demand shocks (blue dashed line), since sector Manufacturing
Electronic can deliver less goods in this case. This is reflected in total output of IT. If there are
no demand shocks present, IT production is higher for the first few time steps (blue solid line),
but drops below the baseline production of both supply and demand shocks (red solid line). We
observe similar dynamics for other industries as well.
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Figure 8: Dynamic effect of supply shocks vs. demand shocks. Normalized values of gross output,
realized consumption, profits and labor compensation for different shock scenarios. Baseline (red) denotes the
model default setup where both supply and demand shocks are used. The black/red line shows the case where
only demand/supply shocks are switched on. The lockdown starts at t = 0 and ends for all industries after two
months at t = 60 (vertical dashed lines).
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Figure 9: How can production decrease when demand shocks are removed? Left panel: Comparing
normalized production at the sectoral level two weeks after lockdown when supply and demand shocks are turned
on (x-axis) and with demand shocks turned off (y-axis). A few large sectors achieve substantially less production
if there are no initial demand shocks in the economy. Right panel: A sectoral example of downstream shock
propagation of the “Baseline” and “Only supply shocks” scenarios in Fig. 8. Sector IT (ISIC J62-3) produces
less after 11 time steps if there are no demand shocks in the economy (blue solid line) compared to both supply
and demand shocks being present (red solid), since it quickly runs out of critical input C26, Manuf. Electronic,
inventories (blue vs. red dashed line). C26 produces the same in both cases (black line) due to binding capacity
constraints. If there are no initial demand shocks, C26 faces higher aggregate demand (blue vs. red crosses).
Due to higher demand for C26 goods and lower production of C26 goods, IT receives less C26 if there are no
demand shocks in the economy.
The case of Manufacturing Electronic production and the coupled output of the IT sector
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exemplifies the complexity of shock propagation through production networks. We highlight
several striking features of this analysis which tend to be entirely neglected in most macroeco-
nomic studies, even if they incorporate industry-specific effects.
First, the specification of production functions and input criticality plays an important role.
Most economic analyses use some form of CES production functions with non-zero substitution
coefficients. Under this approach, while it is in principle possible to construct elaborated CES
nests where different degrees of substitutability are allowed between different inputs of a given
sector (Baqaee & Farhi 2020), in practice it is so hard to calibrate the parameters that only one
(Barrot & Sauvagnat 2016) or a few (Baqaee & Farhi 2020, Bonadio et al. 2020) parameters are
specified. None of the recent IO papers have considered different degrees of substitution between
groups of intermediate inputs. The survey considered here (Appendix C) instead introduces a
distinction between critical and non-critical inputs, for each separate industry, allowing us to
keep the Leontief assumption of a strong lack of substitutability for critical inputs, which is
arguably a key feature of short-run dynamics after large shocks, while at the same time not
allowing some non-critical inputs to prevent production. This is a step toward more realism,
as in exceptional circumstances like a pandemic, we believe that it is likely that firms can
still operate even if several inputs that they usually use are not available. Of course, this is
admittedly imperfect and could be improved, and we have made the strong assumption that the
lack of use a non-critical input simply does not decrease production and translate into higher
profits. Assuming a drop in productivity in this case would change the quantitative results, but
would not, however, fundamentally change the dynamics.
Second, the size of inventories held by industries is crucial. Similar to equity buffers in finan-
cial distress models, inventories act as buffers against production shocks originating upstream
and propagating downstream. Inventory effects are not present in most macroeconomic studies
(Favero et al. 2020, Bodenstein et al. 2020, Eichenbaum et al. 2020, McKibbin & Fernando 2020)
and IO models (see Table 1), and only appear in a very stylized manner in other empirical work
(Mandel & Veetil 2020, Inoue & Todo 2020). Detailed information on input-specific inventories
on industry and firm levels, as well as on behaviour and inventory management rules, could
vastly improve our understanding of shock propagation in production networks.
Third, dynamics really matter over the short time horizons relevant for the pandemic lock-
down and its immediate aftermath. It can take days to weeks for shocks to cascade through
several layers of a large production network and our simulations suggest that it can take months
until the dynamics reach a steady state. Moreover, the presence of input bottlenecks due to the
lack of critical inputs can amplify initial shocks in highly nonlinear ways (see Appendix D.1).
The propagation of shocks is path-dependent. This is due to the fact that different industries
can have very different customers, resulting in heterogeneous contagion dynamics that depend
on “who gets hit first”. General equilibrium models and most input-output models implicitly
assume zero adjustment time and compare pre- and post-shock equilibrium states of the econ-
omy to quantify overall impacts. Our analysis suggests that the shock propagation dynamics
play an important role in the short time horizons of pandemic lockdowns. In other words,
equilibrium comparative static is warranted only when adjustment is faster than the arrival of
new shock (Ando et al. 1963). This is not the case currently, where the lifting of the lockdown
happens before the system has had a chance to reach the lockdown steady-state.
5.3 Re-opening a network economy
We next investigate how unwinding social distancing measures in certain sectors affects overall
economic output. We consider more realistic re-opening scenarios in Section 6.5 together with
their impact on infection. Here, we focus on more stylized, theoretically interesting, examples
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under different production function assumptions to better understand the driving forces behind
overall impacts of staged re-opening.
We study the following simulations: As before we represent the economy in lockdown by
initialising the model as usual with first-order shocks. We then consider two cases. First, the
re-opening scenario where lockdown is relieved after two months for a given set of industries,
i.e. for those industries we set Si,t = 0 and demand adjusts as discussed in Section 3.5. Second,
the lockdown scenario, where the lockdown continues and no shocks are removed. We then
compare the two scenarios to quantify the boost in economic activity of re-opening a given
industry compared to the lockdown.
Fig. 10 summarises our findings. Each panel shows total production normalized by pre-
shock output on the y-axes for both scenarios (re-open sectors in red, continued lockdown in
black). The x-axes shows the number of days where day zero is when the lockdown is lifted in the
re-opening scenario. Thus, the economy was already two months in lockdown before day zero
which is not shown since production is identical for both scenarios during that period. Panel
columns represent simulation results for different production function specifications. Panel rows
indicate the industries which are re-opened if the lockdown is relaxed.
The economic boost of re-opening varies largely between different sectors and also depends
strongly on the production mode assumed. Let us first consider the Leontief production function
(left panels). Here, we find a huge increase in economic activity if the highly upstream primary
sectors (Agriculture and Mining) are re-opened. Note that primary sectors only account for
2% of UK’s total economic output. Opening primary sectors has much smaller effects when
using the baseline production function, where inputs are only partially critical, and the linear
production function, where inputs are are not critical at all.
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Figure 10: Economic performance of indefinite lockdown and re-opening single sectors for different
production functions. Black lines indicate total output if the lockdown continues and red lines if only one
given sector is re-opened at t = 0. Columns represent different production functions, rows denote the sectors
which are re-opened. The left column show the effect of re-opening for different sectors in a Leontief economy.
The center and right columns show the same for the baseline and linear production functions, respectively. Row
1 shows economic effects of re-opening only primary sectors (ISIC A and B). Row 2 shows the same for opening
Manufacturing (ISIC C), row 3 for “Recreation” (ISIC I, R, S) and row 4 for opening all sectors simultaneously.
Note that the scale of the y-axes varies between panels.
When re-opening the much larger manufacturing sectors (15% of total output), we obtain a
completely different impact on economic output. Strikingly, we find for a Leontief production
function that economic output can be lower if manufacturing sectors are opened. The reason
is similar to why smaller aggregate shocks can lead to larger overall impacts as discussed in
Fig 8. Manufacturing is a large sector relying on many inputs which are critical inputs for
other sectors too. Production constraints in other industries might render it impossible to
provide larger amounts of those inputs. If manufacturing sectors are re-opened, competition for
those scarce inputs increases, resulting in less intermediate consumption for non-manufacturing
industries which might face input bottlenecks as a consequence. We do not observe this for
the alternative production function setups which relax the strong Leontief assumption. Here,
economic output increases by 2-3 percentage points.
We find again very different results when reopening Other Services and Food and Accom-
modation, here for brevity called recreation. These sectors are large (6% of total output) and
heavily affected by the lockdown since they include theaters, hotels, restaurants and other so-
cial activities. It is interesting that opening these industries has no impact on overall economic
production when assuming a Leontief production function. This is because these are highly
downstream industries and their economic output is of little significance for the intermediate
consumption of other industries. Thus, opening recreational sectors has mostly demand-side
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effects, and given the capacity constraints of upstream sectors this extra demand cannot be
satisfied, resulting in no change in overall production. We find positive effects of opening recre-
ational sectors under the alternative production function assumptions where total production
increases slightly above lockdown levels.
The bottom row of panels compares the restart of the economy when the lockdown is lifted
for all industries simultaneously. The largest economic boost is given in the Leontief economy
which re-starts at very low levels after lockdown. The recovery paths are similar of our base-
line and the linear production function. Note that recovery is not instantaneous, but takes a
considerable amount of time. A month after re-opening, the economy still operates well below
initial production levels.
6 The effect of reopening on the reproduction number
We attempt to quantify the effects of the re-opening scenarios on R0, the reproduction number
of the epidemic that ultimately determines the overall number of deaths.
Rather than coupling a complete epidemiological model with the economic model, we focus
on determining R0 by modelling only the infection rate as it varies across economic scenarios.
It is illustrative to consider a simple SIR model,
S˙ = −βSI/M, (35)
I˙ = βSI/M − γI,
R˙ = γI,
where dots over a variable denote its time derivative, S is the number of people who are sus-
ceptible, I is the number who are infected, and R is the number who have recovered, and
M = S + I +R the total population, which we assume constant.
The model has two parameters, the transmission rate β and the recovery rate γ. We focus on
the early stage of the epidemic, that is, when the number of recovered individuals is small with
respect to the rest of the population and there is no herd immunity 20. The rate of exponential
growth in the early stages of the epidemic is R0 = β/γ, and is the key parameter determining
the outcome of the outbreak. When R0 < 1, the outbreak is minimal, but when R0 ≥ 1,
the outbreak reaches a finite proportion of the population, and larger R0 implies a larger final
number of individuals infected.
While γ is largely unaffected by public health measures absent any treatments for the disease,
β depends strongly on public policies and individual behavior. Since we are interested in R0,
and γ is relatively constant, we focus on modelling β. To compute R0, we use
R0(t) = βt/γ ∝ βt. (36)
We now discuss how we compute βt, and come back to computing R0 at the end of the section.
6.1 Decomposing infection across activities
The parameter β encompasses two factors: the number of contacts and the risk of infection
during a contact. Usually epidemiologists try to distinguish between contacts at home, school,
work, and other places (Mossong et al. 2008, Mikolajczyk & Kretzschmar 2008, McCreesh et al.
2019, Stro¨mgren et al. 2017, Ferguson et al. 2020, Du et al. 2020). While we also want to distin-
guish home-based and work-based contacts, in the context of reopening industries a key question
20To give an upper bound, Vollmer et al. (2020) recently reported an attack rate of around 13% for Lombardy,
the most affected region of Italy.
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is that of consumption-based infections (Eichenbaum et al. 2020). For instance, reopening cine-
mas would pose a threat to people working in cinemas, but the number of consumers attending
cinemas is vastly larger than the number of workers. Thus, data on the number of contacts at
work would fail to capture this risk.
We decompose β into five sources of infection: infections at the workplace (βw), infections
at school (βs), infections during consumption activities (βc), infections during commuting (βT )
and infections that are not influenced by whether or not an industry is open (for short, “home”
infections βh). We write
β(t) = β∗
(
βw(t) + βs(t) + βc(t) + βT (t) + βh(t)
)
, (37)
where β∗ is a disease specific parameter, and the components sum up to one when the economy
is fully open (t = 0),
βw(0) + βs(0) + βc(0) + βT (0) + βh(0) = 1. (38)
In Appendix E we show how we can derive this equation and the functional form for each
βx(t) where x = w, s, c, T, h. With this formulation we can measure β
∗ using data on the
speed of diffusion of the virus in a fully open economy. Since there are estimates of R0 before
the lockdown, and considering Eq. (36), to evaluate R0 during the lockdown and for various
scenarios we only need to evaluate the changes to each of the terms within the parenthesis in
Eq. (37). To do this we rely on social contact surveys that estimate the intensity-weighted
number of contacts of an average person across each activity (see Table 3 and Appendix F for
details).
Source of infection Symbol Share of intensity-
weighted contacts
Work βw 0.29
School βs 0.28
Consume βc 0.16
Transport βT 0.06
Home-related βh 0.21
Sum 1
Table 3: Calibration of values for Eqs. (37)-(38), using our intensity-weighted share of contacts per activity
derived from Stro¨mgren et al. (2017), see Appendix F.
6.2 Decomposing work and consumption infection across industries
Our goal is to focus on what happens when schools and/or a group of industries are opened
for work and/or for consumption. To do this we split the population into three categories:
a fraction ηs are students and pupils, a fraction ηu are non-working adults, and the rest are
workers, which we further split into N industries, each containing a share ηi of the population,
so that we have
ηs + ηu +
N∑
i=1
ηi = 1. (39)
The adult non-working population (including the inactive and unemployed population) do
not produce output and cannot get infected through the work or study channel. Students
and pupils do not produce output, but they do interact with others and can get infected at
school. Workers produce economic output and can get infected through the work channel. The
economic output and risk of infection of a worker is determined by the industry they work in.
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In what follows we consider policy variables that affect each of the β terms in Eq. (37). For
instance, one of the key policy variables is
δi,w ≡ Share of workers of industry i that go to work physically.
We defer to the next subsection the details of how we compute this share in each scenario.
We now show how each term of Eq. (37) (work, schools, consumption, transport and home) is
computed, and in particular how they depend on δi,w and other policy variables (see Appendix
E and F for more details).
Home-related. We assume that βh(t) is unaffected by whether or not a given industry opens.
However, we account for reduction in household interactions during lockdown due to social
distancing guidelines. We assume that
βh(t) = βh(0)
(
(1− δh)κ+ δh
)
,
where δh is a policy variable that takes the value 0 if social distancing for family/friends con-
tacts is in place and 1 otherwise, and κ is the share of social/family/friends contacts that are
not avoidable by social distancing. We calibrate this by assuming that κ is the share of house-
hold/home contacts, and (1 − κ) is the share of contacts due to visiting friends and relatives,
time in family cars, and contacts in public urban spaces. As discussed in Appendix F, we find
κ = 0.76.
Work-related. Ideally, we would want to know the share of work-related infections that are
due to workers of industry i. We are unable to obtain this, but from O*NET data we can
estimate an index of exposure to infection. To incorporate this information, we assume
βw(t) = βw(0)
N∑
i=1
δi,w
ηibi,w∑N
k=1 ηkbk,w
, (40)
where δi,w is a policy variable that is equal to 1 in the pre-lockdown period (more details
below), bi,w is an indicator of intensity weighted number of contacts in industry i, and ηi is
the share of population in industry i. To calibrate bi,w, we take O*NET occupation-level data
on the exposure to infection and on physical proximity. We construct exposure to infection
and physical proximity indexes at the industry level by using the share of occupations in each
industry, and then construct bi,w as the average of the industry-level exposure to infection and
physical proximity.
Schools. We model students and pupils separately (workers in Education face a risk under
the “Work-related” category). We assume that the school closure implies that all children above
14 (a share 1− g) are not allowed to school, and those at 14 or below (a share g) are allowed if
their parents work but cannot work from home. This excludes from school the children of the
adult non working population, and we assume that the students and pupils do not work. Let
δs be one if schools are open as normal, and zero if they are partially closed. Then, the fraction
of the students and pupils population that are attending school is
µs =
(
δs + (1− δs)
(
g
N∑
i=1
δi,wηi
))
. (41)
For simplicity, we assume that the school infection rate scales linearly with the fraction of
students attending schools as follows,
βs(t) = βs(0)µ
s. (42)
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Consumption-related. We proceed as for work-related infections, and write
βc(t) = βc(0)
N∑
i=1
δi,cbi,c, (43)
where δi,c is a policy variable that is equal to 1 in the pre-lockdown period (more details below),
and the bi,c are such that
∑N
i=1 bi,c = 1. To calibrate bi,c, we derive from Stro¨mgren et al.
(2017) a breakdown of consumption-related contacts into those related to Retail, those related
to Restaurants, and those related to Sports Venues. We then map each of these three categories
into a single separate WIOD classification.
Public transport. Formally transport is just an industry where consumers risk catching the
virus. However, in other consumption-related industries, the number of consumers depends
only whether this particular industry is open. Transport is different because the number of
people taking transport depends on how many other industries are open - if all industries are
open, trains are packed and there are more contacts/infections. Therefore we treat Transport
separately, and we assume that all transport-related infections are between commuters. If we
assume that the number of contacts of one commuter is proportional to the number of other
commuters, infections are proportional to the square of the proportion of usual commuters that
do commute in a given scenario. Thus, we have
βT (t) = βT (0)
(
µsηs +
∑N
i=1 δi,wηi
ηs +
∑N
i=1 ηi
)2
(44)
where the left term inside the parenthesis corresponds to student commuters and the right
term to work commuters. The term in the denominator is a normalizing factor that guarantees
consistency at time t = 0. (See Appendix E for details on the derivation).
6.3 Policy scenarios: reopening selected industries
A policy is a set Λ ≡
{
{δi,c}i=1...N , {δi,w}i=1...N , δs, δh
}
. It is helpful to first note the values of
Λ before and after the lockdown.
Pre-Lockdown. All industries are open for workers and consumers. All schools are open and
there is no friends and family social distancing.
δi,w(Pre-Lockdown) = 1
δi,c(Pre-Lockdown) = 1
δs(Pre-Lockdown) = 1
δh(Pre-Lockdown) = 1
In this case, β(t) = β∗.
Scenario I: Full lockdown. Workers go to work physically if and only if they are essential
and they cannot work from home, which happens for a share of workers equal to eiw(1 − ri),
where eiw is the degree to which the industry is essential, and ri is the Remote Labor Index (see
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Appendix A for details on how we estimate eiw and ri for each industry). Consumers consume
physically only what they can consume physically.
δi,w(Lockdown) = ei,w(1− ri)
δi,c(Lockdown) = ei,c
δs(Lockdown) = 0
δh(Lockdown) = 0
where ei,c is an “essential consumption index”. For each industry (in fact, retail is the only
relevant one), it indicates how much of infection-related consumption is still open during lock-
down. In practice, we assume ei,c = 0 for all industries except retail, and ei,c = ei,w for retail,
that is, we assume that the share of the retail-based infections that continue during lockdown
can be proxied by the share of retail workers who are essential.
We consider four degrees of reopening: roughly speaking, reopening only manufacturing and
construction, reopening everything except consumer-facing industries (with or without fully re-
opening schools), and reopening everything. For all scenarios we assume that friends and family
social distancing remains in place, δh = 0, and and that everyone that can work from home
continues to work remotely. Table 4 shows the main scenarios and the key dimensions in which
they differ.
I II III IV V VI
Scenario Lockdown Manufacturing
and Construc-
tion
All except
consumer-
facing.
All except
consumer-
facing,
Schools
opened
Open Pre-
lockdown
Work from home? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Schools open? Partially Partially Partially Fully Fully Fully
On-site consumption open? No No No No Yes Yes
Home-related distancing? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Table 4: Six scenarios for reopening the economy.
Scenario II: Manufacturing and Construction. We label this scenario “Manufacturing
and Construction” for short, but we mean opening all A-F industries: Agriculture, Mining,
Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction. Because all workers who can work from home do
so, we have
δi,w(Manufacturing and Construction) =
{
(1− ri) ∀i ∈ A-F,
ei,w(1− ri) ∀i ∈ G-T.
δi,c(Manufacturing and Construction) = ei,c ∀i.
Scenario III: All except consumer-facing. This means opening all industries (A-T), ex-
cept the three “consumer-facing” industries G47 (Retail), I (Accommodation and Food), and
RS (Other Services, which includes recreation and personal services).
δi,w(All except consumer-facing.) =
{
eiw(1− ri) ∀i ∈
{
G47, I, RS
}
,
(1− ri) otherwise.
δi,c(All except consumer-facing.) = ei,c ∀i.
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Scenario IV: All except consumer-facing. + Schools. This is the same as Scenario III,
but we assume that schools are fully open instead of receiving only children of workers who
cannot work from home, that is δs = 1
Scenario V: Open. We reopen all industries for work and consumption.
δi,w(All open) = (1− ri) ∀i
δi,c(All open) = 1 ∀i.
6.4 Computing R0
We assume that before the lockdown, R0(pre-lockdown) = 2.6 (Jarvis et al. 2020). Then we
compute how β is reduced by social distancing measures during the lockdown. This gives us an
estimate of the lockdown R0 which we denote R˜0
R˜0 = R0(pre-lockdown)× β(lockdown)
β(pre-lockdown)
(45)
We find R˜0 ≈ 0.90. However, the recent study by Jarvis et al. (2020) finds that in the UK
during lockdown, R0 ≈ 0.62. It is not surprising that we overestimate the lockdown R0, as our
model does not incorporate all the basic sanitary measures that would apply to the contacts
that have not been reduced. For instance, we consider supermarket infections to stay the same
because supermarkets are open, but social distancing applies in supermarkets and there are
extra cleaning procedures in place. Another example would be essential workers. In our model,
essential workers contribute to infections now just as they did before, while in reality it is likely
that their conditions have been made at least a bit safer. A final example includes the effect of
information campaigns on hand washing. To take this into account, we rescale all our estimates
for the scenarios so that they start from a lockdown value at 0.62.
R0(Λ) =
0.62
R˜0
× β(Λ)
β(pre-lockdown)
(46)
This rescaling implies that fully re-opening the economy back to the pre-lockdown situation
(that is, removing all limitations to work, consumption, school and social contact, while keeping
the extra sanitary precautions) would bring R0 to (0.62/1.04)× 2.6 = 1.55.
We obtain standard errors for R0 as follows. Jarvis et al. (2020) report a pre-lockdown
mean R0 of 2.6 with a standard error of 0.54, that is, a standard error of 0.54/2.6 = 21% of the
mean. Their post-lockdown estimate is 0.62 with a 95% confidence interval (0.37 - 0.89), that
is, a standard error of ((0.62 − 0.37)/2)/0.62 = 20% of the mean. In view of this, we assume
that for all our estimates, one standard error always equal 20% of the mean R0 estimates. We
report confidence intervals as two standard errors around the mean.
6.5 Economic performance vs. infections: sector-specific re-opening
We now show simulations for the four economic scenarios outlined in Section 6.3: lockdown,
open manufacturing and construction, open all industries except consumer-facing ones, open all
industries (school opening does not affect economic scenario).
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Figure 11: Reopening scenarios. We show production normalized to pre-lockdown levels, for four months
since lockdown starts, assuming lockdown is lifted . We consider the four economic scenarios outlined in Section
6.3.
As can be seen in Figure 11, keeping the lockdown leads to a further reduction in production,
due to firms exhausting their inventories. Re-opening only all A-F industries (Agriculture,
Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction) leads to an increase in production, however
the jump is much bigger when opening all industries except consumer-facing ones. Conversely,
there is not a large benefit in terms of production from opening consumer-facing industries. To
compute the increases in production in Figure 1, we consider the first 30 days after lockdown
is lifted; as it is easy to see, the economy is far from completely recovering after 30 days, as
discussed in Section 4.
There is a trade-off between an increase in production and mitigating the epidemic spread
when opening industries. In the bar plot in Fig. 1 we illustrate this trade-off. The bars on
the left show our estimates of R0, the higher the bar, the faster the epidemic spread. The bars
on the right show the GDP (as a percentage of the pre-lockdown GDP) of each scenario. In
Scenario II, where Manufacturing and Construction open, the effect on R0 is negligible, but has
a 3 percentage points higher GDP than the lockdown scenario. The negligible increase in R0 is
due to the low percentage of the labor force that resumes work. 15% of the employed people
work in A−F industries, and only 10% cannot work from home. Furthermore, 6% were already
working on-site due to the essential nature of their work. Thus, under scenario II, only 4% of
the employed labor force resume on-site work.
Scenario III presents a slight increase in R0 with respect to the lockdown scenario. The slight
increase is mostly because non-consumer-facing industries from G − R S have a high remote
labor index. Therefore, assuming that all the workers that can telework stay home, the number
of people returning to work is small. Scenario III has a 8 percentage points higher GDP than
the lockdown scenario. This is due to a direct effect as well as a indirect effect where business
services now resume work in tandem with primary and secondary sector, lifting key bottlenecks
in supply chains.
Scenario IV, where we include opening schools for all children (not only for the below 14
children of people working on-site), increases R0 substantially. With 17% of the population
being 14 years old or younger, it is not surprising that opening schools increases the speed of
the epidemic spread. Since we do not consider productivity decrease due to childcare work,
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the GDP of Scenario IV is equal to the GDP in Scenario III. Scenario V, where consumer-
facing industries open, increases substantially epidemic spread due to the share of contacts that
happen in restaurants, hotels, gyms, etc. However, there is only a 2 percentage point increase
in GDP compared to the previous scenario. This is mostly due to a lack of recovery in demand
for the hospitality and recreation industries.
7 Discussion
In this paper we have investigated how locking down and re-opening the economy as a policy
response to the COVID-19 pandemic affects economic performance and contagion. We intro-
duced a novel economic model specifically designed to address the unique features of the current
pandemic. The model is industry-specific, incorporating the production network and inventory
dynamics. We use survey results by industry experts to model how critical different inputs
are in the production of a specific industry. We calibrate the model to the UK economy and
find that two months after lockdown gross output and consumption are down by 27% when
compared to pre-lockdown levels.
We find that industries are affected by direct demand and supply shocks in highly het-
erogeneous ways. While many manufacturing industries face large supply shocks, transport
industries experience mostly demand-side shocks. Other industries including hotels and restau-
rants are substantially exposed to both shock types simultaneously. We find similar industrial
heterogeneity for higher-order impacts.
We analysed how shocks propagate through the production network, resulting in non-trivial
economic impacts. First, we have shown that input criticality plays an important role in the
downstream amplification of shocks. Second, we found that inventory levels can act as buffers
against production shocks and are crucial for understanding economic impacts – an aspect
usually neglected in other studies. Third, it has become evident that time scales matter as
shock propagation is not immediate but takes time. Overall, we find that first-order shocks can
be translated into overall impacts in highly nonlinear ways. We even find cases where smaller
aggregate shocks can lead to larger economic impacts as a result of unbalanced supply and
demand dynamics. This ‘coordination failure’ suggests that it could be dangerous to re-open
single sectors of the economy by themselves without understanding how they are embedded in
the production network. Our results suggest that the economic boost from opening an industry
depends on the up-/downstream location of that industry as well as how severe the economy
suffers from input bottlenecks. In case the economy faces serious productive constraints, re-
opening a single sector can even have adverse effects on economic output.
There is a trade-off between re-opening the economy and facing an increase in epidemic
spreading. To help understand this we develop an epidemic model where the infection rate is
divided between different economic-related activities: work, schools, consumption, transport,
and others. Within work and consumption, we consider the relative risk of infection between
industries. We find that there is little variance between the risk of infection workers face in
different industries. In contrast, the risk of infection due to consumption is concentrated in
three consumer-facing industries: retail, restaurants and hotels, and other services (including
gym and entertainment events). Our results show that keeping consumer-facing industries and
schools closed, and having people who can telework work from home can significantly increase
the economic output while having a relatively small increase in the spread of the epidemic.
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Appendix
A First-order economic shocks and work context industry vari-
ables
A.1 NAICS-WIOD mapping of shocks
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic industries experience supply-side reductions due to the closure
of non-essential industries and workers not being able to perform their activities at home. Many
industries also face substantial reductions in demand. del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020) provide
quantitative predictions of these first-order supply and demand shocks for the US economy. To
calculate supply-side predictions, del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020) classified industries as essential
or non-essential and constructed a Remote Labor Index, which measures the ability of different
occupations to work from home. Under the assumption that the distribution of occupations
across industries and that the percentage of essential workers within an industry is the same for
the US and the UK, we can map the supply-shocks estimated by del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020)
into the UK economy as follows.
First, we build a crosswalk from the NAICS 4-digit industry classification to the classification
system used in WIOD, which is a mix of ISIC 2-digit and 1-digit codes. We build this crosswalk
using the NAICS to ISIC 2-digit crosswalk from the European Commission and then aggregating
the 2-digit codes that are presented as 1-digit in the WIOD classification system. We then do
an employment-weighted aggregation of the supply shocks from del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020)
for the 277 industries at the NAICS 4-digit classification level to the 55 industries in the WIOD
classification. Some of the 4-digit NAICS industries map into more than one WIOD industry
classification. When this happens we assume employment is split uniformly among the WIOD
industries the NAICS industry maps into. Finally, we make one modification to deal with
imputed rents for the Real Estate Sector. Imputed rents account for 69% of the monetary value
of the sector21. We assume that the supply shock does not affect imputed rents for the Real
State Sector and thus consider that the supply shock only affects 31% of the sector. With this
modification the final supply shock to the Real Estate Sector is 15%.
For calibrating consumption demand shocks, we use the same data as del Rio-Chanona et al.
(2020) which are based on the Congressional Budget Office (2006) estimates. These estimates
are available only on the more aggregate 2-digit NAICS level which are straightforward to map
into WIOD ISIC categories. Table 5 gives an overview of all first-order shocks applied to WIOD
industries.
A.2 Essential score, remote labor index, and industries’ work context
Using the same methodology as before, i.e., doing a crosswalk from NAICS-4 digit to the
classification system used in WIOD and using employment shares to aggregate, we map the
essential score and remote labor index computed in del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020) into the
WIOD list of industries. We use these industry remote labor index and essential score at the
WIOD industry classification level to estimate the number of people working in each industry
for each scenario i.e., to estimate δiw(t).
O*NET provides different Work Context22 indices for occupations, including “Exposure to
disease and infection” and “Physical proximity”, for brevity we refer to these indexes as exposure
21Calculation obtained from monetary values reported in https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/
grossvalueaddedgva/datasets/nominalandrealregionalgrossvalueaddedbalancedbyindustry
22 https://www.onetonline.org/find/descriptor/browse/Work_Context/
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Figure 12: Remote Labor Index of industries. Remote labor index of the WIOD industry classification. See
Table 5 for code-industry name.
to infection and physical proximity. Using the same methodology than del Rio-Chanona et al.
(2020) we map these occupation indexes into the NAICS 4-digit industry classification. In
particular, we use the data from the BLS, which indicates the occupational composition of each
industry, and take the employment weighted average of the occupation’s work context employed
in each industry. After computing the exposure to infection, physical proximity and outdoors
work for the industries at the NAICS 4-digit industry classification we map them into the
WIOD classification system with the above mentioned crosswalk methodology. As we explain
in Appendix F we use the exposure to infection and physical proximity index of each industry
to estimate the relative risk of contracting COVID-19 workers in each industry face.
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Supply Cons. demand Other demand
ISIC Sector x S RLI ess. c D f f shock
A01 Agriculture 0.8 0.0 14 100 0.9 -10 0.3 -20
A02 Foresty 0.0 -85.0 15 0 0.0 -10 0.0 -23
A03 Fishing 0.1 0.0 36 100 0.0 -10 0.1 -32
B Mining 1.3 -35.3 31 51 0.1 -10 1.4 -33
C10-C12 Manuf. Food-Beverages 2.8 -0.6 22 99 2.5 -10 1.3 -32
C13-C15 Manuf. Textiles 0.4 -37.1 31 47 0.1 -10 0.5 -27
C16 Manuf. Wood 0.2 -61.1 27 18 0.1 -10 0.1 -16
C17 Manuf. Paper 0.4 -7.5 31 89 0.1 -10 0.2 -30
C18 Media print 0.3 -6.0 39 90 0.1 -10 0.1 -18
C19 Manuf. Coke-Petroleum 0.9 -18.3 36 71 1.5 -10 0.7 -33
C20 Manuf. Chemical 1.1 -2.6 37 96 0.3 -10 1.6 -32
C21 Manuf. Pharmaceutical 0.7 -1.1 40 98 0.3 -10 1.2 -31
C22 Manuf. Rubber-Plastics 0.7 -28.3 29 60 0.1 -10 0.6 -28
C23 Manuf. Minerals 0.5 -50.3 36 20 0.1 -10 0.2 -27
C24 Manuf. Metals-basic 0.6 -57.7 27 20 0.0 -10 1.7 -33
C25 Manuf. Metals-fabricated 1.1 -54.8 34 18 0.1 -10 0.7 -18
C26 Manuf. Electronic 0.8 -38.5 57 10 0.2 -10 1.4 -28
C27 Manuf. Electric 0.4 -33.3 37 46 0.1 -10 0.8 -30
C28 Manuf. Machinery 1.1 -49.7 38 20 0.2 -10 2.1 -30
C29 Manuf. Vehicles 1.6 -22.6 30 65 1.3 -10 2.6 -29
C30 Manuf. Transport-other 1.0 -48.8 40 17 0.1 -10 2.5 -31
C31 C32 Manuf. Furniture 0.6 -36.6 35 43 0.2 -10 0.8 -25
C33 Repair-Installation 0.4 -3.3 39 95 0.0 -10 0.0 -17
D35 Electricity-Gas 3.2 0.0 42 100 3.6 0 0.1 -20
E36 Water 0.2 0.0 33 100 0.6 0 0.0 -11
E37-E39 Sewage 0.8 0.0 30 100 0.6 0 1.1 -16
F Construction 7.9 -35.6 28 51 0.3 -10 11.5 -6
G45 Vehicle trade 1.7 -31.6 45 41 2.1 -10 0.6 -23
G46 Wholesale 3.5 -23.6 50 51 3.3 -10 4.3 -30
G47 Retail 4.7 -30.5 50 37 16.4 -10 0.6 -28
H49 Land transport 2.0 -11.1 31 83 2.7 -67 0.2 -28
H50 Water transport 0.6 -12.4 35 81 0.6 -67 0.7 -32
H51 Air transport 0.6 -0.1 29 100 1.2 -67 0.4 -32
H52 Warehousing 1.4 -0.5 30 99 0.1 -67 0.4 -26
H53 Postal 0.7 0.0 36 100 0.1 0 0.1 -30
I Accommodation-Food 2.9 -60.8 35 6 8.4 -80 0.7 -32
J58 Publishing 0.6 -14.4 70 48 0.5 0 0.6 -24
J59 J60 Video-Sound-Broadcasting 0.9 -32.8 56 34 1.1 0 1.2 -15
J61 Telecommunications 1.6 -0.9 55 99 1.9 0 0.8 -22
J62 J63 IT 2.3 -0.2 71 99 0.2 0 2.6 -13
K64 Finance 4.3 0.0 71 100 3.2 0 2.9 -32
K65 Insurance 3.2 0.0 71 100 6.3 0 1.5 -31
K66 Auxil. Finance-Insurance 1.1 0.0 72 100 0.2 0 2.0 -33
L68 Real estate 7.8 -4.8 49 6 25.3 0 1.0 -8
M69 M70 Legal 2.8 -2.0 64 94 0.0 0 1.3 -25
M71 Architecture-Engineering 1.7 0.0 54 100 0.1 0 1.4 -19
M72 R&D 0.5 0.0 59 100 0.0 0 1.1 -11
M73 Advertising 0.6 -22.5 60 36 0.0 0 0.3 -30
M74 M75 Other Science 0.7 -3.0 61 94 0.3 0 1.0 -30
N Private Administration 4.4 -34.9 36 42 1.0 0 2.7 -29
O84 Public Administration 4.8 -1.1 45 97 0.6 0 11.9 -1
P85 Education 4.2 0.0 54 100 1.6 0 8.7 -2
Q Health 7.0 -0.1 36 100 2.8 15 15.0 1
R S Other Service 3.2 -34.5 39 47 5.6 -5 2.5 -10
T Household activities 0.2 0.0 0 0 0.8 0 0.0 -32
Table 5: Industry-specific first-order shocks. Column x denotes relative shares of gross output, S the
supply shock, RLI the Remote Labor Index and ess. the essential score of industries. Column c represents relative
shares of consumer consumption and D the demand shock to consumption. Column f denotes relative shares of
other final consumption (exports, gross capital formation, inventory changes, government) and f shock the shock
to other final demand. All values are in %.
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B Inventory data and calibration
We could not find UK data to calibrate inventory target parameters nj in Eq. (8). The only
reliable data that we could find are those from the US National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA). We describe these data and how we processed them in this appendix. We obtain ratios
of level of inventories to monthly sales across industries, with a high level of disaggregation
for manufacturing industries, and more uniform information for other industries. Among other
things, we show that these ratios are remarkably stable over time. We take this evidence as
supporting the idea that inventory to sales ratios are fundamental concepts that have to do
with the nature of production rather than with specificities of the US economy. Therefore, we
consider these ratios as proxies of nj , after multiplying them by 30 to take into account that
we are considering a daily rather than a monthly time scale.
B.1 Data sources
All inventory data have been sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). In particular, we used data from the following tables:
• Table 5.8.6B. Real Private Inventories and Real Domestic Final Sales by Industry, Chained
Dollars - LastRevised: March 26, 2020 [BEA/NIPA-T50806B]
• Table 208. Real Gross Output by industry, Chained Dollars - LastRevised: April 6, 2020
[BEA/GDPbyIndustry-208Q]
• Table 1BU. Real Manufacturing and Trade Inventories, Seasonally Adjusted, End of
Period [Chained 2012 dollars, 1997 forward, NAICS] - LastRevised: March 26, 2020
[BEA/NIUnderlyingDetail-U001B]
• Table 2BU. Real Manufacturing and Trade Sales, Seasonally Adjusted at Monthly Rate
[Chained 2012 dollars, 1997 forward, NAICS] - LastRevised: March 26, 2020 [BEA/NIUnderlyingDetail-
U002BU]
• Table 4BU1. Real Manufacturing Inventories, by Stage of Fabrication (Materials and sup-
plies), Seasonally Adjusted, End of Period [Chained 2012 dollars, 1997 forward, NAICS]
- LastRevised: March 26, 2020 [BEA/NIUnderlyingDetail-U004B1]
• Table 4BU2. Real Manufacturing Inventories, by Stage of Fabrication (Work-in-process),
Seasonally Adjusted, End of Period [Chained 2012 dollars, 1997 forward, NAICS] - Las-
tRevised: March 26, 2020 [BEA/NIUnderlyingDetail-U004B2]
• Table 4BU3. Real Manufacturing Inventories, by Stage of Fabrication (Finished goods),
Seasonally Adjusted, End of Period [Chained 2012 dollars, 1997 forward, NAICS] - Las-
tRevised: March 26, 2020 [BEA/NIUnderlyingDetail-U004B3]
For inventory data, we started considering tables 4BU1, 4BU2 and 4BU3, focusing on all 3-
digit NAICS manufacturing sectors. We then added information on inventories in trade sectors
from table 1BU, focusing on the following industries: Merchant wholesale industries (NAICS
42 except 4251), motor vehicles, parts, and supplies wholesalers (4231), retail trade industries
(44-45), motor vehicle and parts dealers (441). We finally added information on inventories in
all other industries from table 5.8.6B.23
23We also complemented merchant wholesale industries by adding non-merchant wholesale (4251), so as to
recover the wholesale sector as a whole.
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We then used tables 208 and 2BU to extract information on gross output by industry.
Information about gross output in wholesale and retail trade is not consistent in the two tables:
in table 208 (and several other sources), yearly gross output for these sectors is around 1800
billion dollars; in table 2BU, it is around 6000 billion dollars. We use information from table
208, as, according to the BEA, “underlying detail” tables such as 2BU may be less accurate.24
The latest available data (2019Q4) are reported in Table 7, where we also report monthly
gross output and the ratio between the level of inventories and monthly gross output. For
presentation purposes, we split inventories in certain aggregate sectors according to output
shares of subsectors within these sectors — for example, we disambiguate between mining,
utilities and construction, although these are given together in table 5.8.6B.
As shown in Fig. 13, the ratios between the level of inventories and monthly gross output are
remarkably stable (ratios are normalized to their values in 2019Q4), varying by no more than
20% in the last 10 years. There appears to be an upward trend from 1997, where the average
ratio was around 80% of the 2019Q4 value, and the only industries whose ratios increased
substantially are apparel manufacturing and leather and allied products manufacturing. We
view the temporal stability of these ratios as supporting the idea that they can be used for
other countries.
B.2 Mapping to WIOD codes
We next map data from NAICS to the industrial classification used in the World Input Output
Database (WIOD), which is an aggregation of 2-digit International Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (ISIC) sectors. Using official concordance tables, which are valid for 4-digit NAICS and
ISIC codes, is not the best option, as our data are not available to that level of disaggregation.
We resort instead to manual mapping between the NAICS sectors for which we have data and
the WIOD sectors. In particular, we use the crosswalk available in Table 6. When a NAICS
sector maps uniquely to a WIOD sector, we directly attribute inventory and gross output data.
When multiple NAICS sectors map to (one or more) WIOD sectors, we aggregate data for all
relevant NAICS sectors. When one or more NAICS sector map to multiple WIOD sectors, we
attribute data using as weights sectoral gross outputs from the 2014 WIOD table for the U.S.
The results are shown in Table 8. They make sense. As an example, consider the ratio
between level of inventories and monthly gross output in the NAICS sectors 313, 314, 315, 316
and in the WIOD sector C13-C15. It is clear that the latter is a weighted average of the former
ratios, weighted by the size of the NAICS subsectors.
24We do not find any other discrepancy, for example information provided in tables 4BU1-4BU2-4BU3 was
consistent with more aggregate information in table 1BU, and that information was in turn consistent with data
from table 5.8.6B.
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NAICS WIOD
321 C16
327 C23
331 C24
332 C25
333 C28
334 C26
335 C27
336 C29, C30
337, 339 C31 C32, C33
311, 312 C10-C12
313, 314, 315, 316 C13-C15
322 C17
323 C18
324 C19
325 C20, C21
326 C22
4231 441 G45
42-4231 G46
44 45-441 G47
11 A01, A02, A03
21 23 B, D35, E36, E37-E39, F
48 92
H49, H50, H51, H52, H53, I, J58, J59 J60, J61, J62 J63, K64, K65, K66, L68,
M69 M70, M71, M72, M73, M74 M75, N, O84, P85, Q, R S, T
Table 6: Crosswalk NAICS to WIOD
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Table 7: Data are from 2019Q4. Everything in millions of 2012 chained dollars.
naics code naics name stock mat sup work in process finished goods total inv go yearly go monthly ratio inv go monthly
321 Wood product manufacturing 4975 2072 4638 11685 93672 7806 1.50
327 Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 6497 1728 8456 16681 110484 9207 1.81
331 Primary metal manufacturing 15409 12215 15307 42931 249984 20832 2.06
332 Fabricated metal product manufacturing 25870 20066 25938 71874 368076 30673 2.34
333 Machinery manufacturing 29528 18621 20667 68816 353964 29497 2.33
334 Computer and electronic product manufacturing 24361 19743 16948 61052 335520 27960 2.18
335 Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing 10743 7907 7457 26107 132144 11012 2.37
336 Transportation equipment manufacturing 34067 98210 17703 149980 936336 78028 1.92
337 Furniture and related product manufacturing 5057 1883 3538 10478 71112 5926 1.77
339 Miscellaneous durable goods manufacturing 11069 6560 15186 32815 151440 12620 2.60
311 Food manufacturing 21590 9238 38713 69541 801432 66786 1.04
312 Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 8981 5681 7141 21803 124788 10399 2.10
313 Textile mills 2056 1179 2721 5956 28332 2361 2.52
314 Textile product mills 1419 683 2296 4398 23880 1990 2.21
315 Apparel manufacturing 2127 1496 5193 8816 10692 891 9.89
316 Leather and allied product manufacturing 645 311 1288 2244 4572 381 5.89
322 Paper manufacturing 11145 2110 8814 22069 174264 14522 1.52
323 Printing and related support activities 2820 1163 3137 7120 76968 6414 1.11
324 Petroleum and coal product manufacturing 18917 20958 32313 72188 1033320 86110 0.84
325 Chemical manufacturing 41896 23577 52226 117699 734484 61207 1.92
326 Plastics and rubber product manufacturing 14955 3936 15273 34164 223452 18621 1.83
42 Wholesale industries 823900 0 0 823900 1861400 155117 5.31
4231 Motor vehicles, parts, and supplies wholesalers 63705 0 0 63705 138677 11556 5.51
44-45 Retail trade industries 674155 0 0 674155 1844000 153667 4.39
441 Motor vehicle and parts dealers 257911 0 0 257911 363100 30258 8.52
111-113 Farms 0 0 174416 174416 487200 40600 4.30
114-115 Forestry, fishing, and related activities 0 0 19368 19368 54100 4508 4.30
21 Mining 0 0 32662 32662 732800 61067 0.53
22 Utilities 0 0 20316 20316 455800 37983 0.53
23 Construction 60363 0 0 60363 1354300 112858 0.53
48-49 Transportation and warehousing 10737 0 0 10737 1163000 96917 0.11
51 Information 18463 0 0 18463 1999800 166650 0.11
52-53 Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 55949 0 0 55949 6060000 505000 0.11
54-56 Professional and business services 37009 0 0 37009 4008500 334042 0.11
61-62 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 25173 0 0 25173 2726500 227208 0.11
71-72-81 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 12343 0 0 12343 1336900 111408 0.11
92 Government 33553 0 0 33553 3634200 302850 0.11
49
Table 8: Data are from 2019Q4. Everything in millions of 2012 chained dollars.
wiod code wiod name stock mat sup work in process finished goods go yearly tot inv go monthly ratio inv go monthly
A01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities 0 0 172754 482557 172754 40213 4.30
A02 Forestry and logging 0 0 13056 36470 13056 3039 4.30
A03 Fishing and aquaculture 0 0 7974 22273 7974 1856 4.30
B Mining and quarrying 0 0 31740 712120 31740 59343 0.53
C10-C12 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 30571 14919 45854 926220 91344 77185 1.18
C13-C15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 6247 3669 11498 67476 21414 5623 3.81
C16
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; man-
ufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
4975 2072 4638 93672 11685 7806 1.50
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 11145 2110 8814 174264 22069 14522 1.52
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 2820 1163 3137 76968 7120 6414 1.11
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 18917 20958 32313 1033320 72188 86110 0.84
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 30865 17369 38475 541095 86709 45091 1.92
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 11031 6208 13751 193389 30990 16116 1.92
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 14955 3936 15273 223452 34164 18621 1.83
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 6497 1728 8456 110484 16681 9207 1.81
C24 Manufacture of basic metals 15409 12215 15307 249984 42931 20832 2.06
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 25870 20066 25938 368076 71874 30673 2.34
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 24361 19743 16948 335520 61052 27960 2.18
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 10743 7907 7457 132144 26107 11012 2.37
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29528 18621 20667 353964 68816 29497 2.33
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 21551 62129 11199 592339 94879 49362 1.92
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 12516 36081 6504 343997 55101 28666 1.92
C31 C32 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing 13924 7290 16168 192166 37382 16014 2.33
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 2202 1153 2556 30386 5911 2532 2.33
D35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0 0 19237 431602 19237 35967 0.53
E36 Water collection, treatment and supply 0 0 657 14746 657 1229 0.53
E37-E39
Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery;
remediation activities and other waste management services
0 0 4371 98070 4371 8173 0.53
F Construction 57335 0 0 1286362 57335 107197 0.53
G45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 321616 0 0 501777 321616 41815 7.69
G46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 760195 0 0 1722723 760195 143560 5.30
G47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 416244 0 0 1480900 416244 123408 3.37
H49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 5299 0 0 573956 5299 47830 0.11
H50 Water transport 653 0 0 70739 653 5895 0.11
H51 Air transport 1957 0 0 211979 1957 17665 0.11
H52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 2031 0 0 219937 2031 18328 0.11
H53 Postal and courier activities 1144 0 0 123877 1144 10323 0.11
I Accommodation and food service activities 9256 0 0 1002493 9256 83541 0.11
J58 Publishing activities 3427 0 0 371174 3427 30931 0.11
J59 J60
Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording
and music publishing activities; programming and broadcasting activities
3351 0 0 362983 3351 30249 0.11
J61 Telecommunications 6735 0 0 729434 6735 60786 0.11
J62 J63
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; information service
activities
5816 0 0 629926 5816 52494 0.11
K64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 7307 0 0 791410 7307 65951 0.11
K65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 10347 0 0 1120663 10347 93389 0.11
K66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 4967 0 0 537998 4967 44833 0.11
L68 Real estate activities 28803 0 0 3119741 28803 259978 0.11
M69 M70
Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; management consul-
tancy activities
11781 0 0 1276047 11781 106337 0.11
M71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 4626 0 0 501018 4626 41752 0.11
M72 Scientific research and development 2492 0 0 269945 2492 22495 0.11
M73 Advertising and market research 2510 0 0 271811 2510 22651 0.11
M74 M75 Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities 819 0 0 88716 819 7393 0.11
N Administrative and support service activities 11268 0 0 1220478 11268 101706 0.11
O84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 35648 0 0 3861125 35648 321760 0.11
P85 Education 3317 0 0 359267 3317 29939 0.11
Q Human health and social work activities 21640 0 0 2343861 21640 195322 0.11
R S Other service activities 7819 0 0 846949 7819 70579 0.11
T
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-
producing activities of households for own use
216 0 0 23374 216 1948 0.11
U Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies
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C Critical vs. non-critical inputs
A survey was designed to address the question when production can continue during a lockdown.
For each industry, IHS Markit analysts were asked to rate every input of a given industry. The
exact formulation of the question was as follows: “For each industry in WIOD, please rate
whether each of its inputs are essential. We will present you with an industry X and ask you to
rate each input Y. The key question is: Can production continue in industry X if input Y is not
available for two months?” Analysts could rate each input according to the following allowed
answers:
• 0 – This input is not essential
• 1 – This input is essential
• 0.5 – This input is important but not essential
• NA – I have no idea
To avoid confusion with the unrelated definition of essential industries which we used to calibrate
first-order supply shocks, we refer to inputs as critical and non-critical instead of essential and
non-essential.
Analysts were provided with the share of each input in the expenses of the industry. It was
also made explicit that the ratings assume no inventories such that a rating captures the effect
on production if the input is not available.
Every industry was rated by one analyst, except for industries Mining and Quarrying (B)
and Manufacture of Basic Metals (C24) which were rated by three analysts. To improve input
ratings, we aim to increase the sample size of analyst ratings for every industry in the next few
weeks. In case there are several ratings we took the average of the ratings and rounded it to
1 if the average was at least 2/3 and 0 if the average was at most 1/3. Average input ratings
lying between these boundaries are assigned the value 0.5.
The ratings for each industry and input are depicted in Fig. 14. A column denotes an
industry and the corresponding rows its inputs. Blue colors indicate critical, red important,
but not critical and white non-critical inputs. Note that under the assumption of a Leontief
production function every element would be considered to be critical, yielding a completely
blue-colored matrix. The results shown here indicate that the majority of elements are non-
critical inputs (2,338 ratings with score = 0), whereas only 477 industry-inputs are rates as
critical. 365 inputs are rates as important, although not critical (score = 0.5) and NA was
assigned eleven times.
The left panel of Fig. 15 shows for each industry how often it was rated as critical input
to other industries (x-axis) and how many critical inputs this industry relies on in its own
production (y-axis). Electricity and Gas (D35) are rated most frequently as critical inputs in
the production of other industries (score=1 for almost 60% of industries). Also frequently rated
as critical are Land Transport (H49) and Telecommunications (J61). On the other hand, many
manufacturing industries (ISIC codes starting with C) stand out as relying on a large number
of critical inputs. For example, around 27% of inputs to Manufacture of Coke and Refined
Petroleum Products (C19) as well as to Manufacture of Chemicals (C20) are rated as critical.
The center panel of Fig. 15 shows the equivalent plot for 0.5 ratings (important, but not
critical inputs). Financial Services (K64) are most frequently rated as important inputs which
do not necessarily stop the production of an industry if not available. Conversely, the industry
relying on many important, but not binding inputs is Wholesale and Retail Trade (G46) of which
almost half of its inputs got rated with a score = 0.5. This makes sense given that this industry
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Figure 14: Criticality scores of IHS Markit analysts. Rows are inputs (supply) and columns industries using these
inputs (demand). The blue color indicates critical (score=1), red important (score=0.5) and white non-critical
(score=0) inputs. Black denotes inputs which have been rated with NA. The diagonal elements are considered
to be critical by definition. For industries with multiple input-ratings we took the average of all ratings and
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Figure 15: (Left panel) Plotting how often an industry is rated as an critical input to other industries (x-axis)
against the share of critical inputs this industry is using. The center and right panel are the same as the left
panel, except for using half-critical and non-critical scores, respectively. In each plot the identity line is shown.
Point sizes are proportional to gross output.
heavily relies on all these inputs, but lacking one of these does not halt economic production.
This case also illustrates that a Leontief production function could starkly overestimated input
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bottlenecks as Wholesale and Retail Trade would most likely still be able to realize output even
if a several inputs would not be available.
In the right panel of Fig. 15 we show the same scatter plot but for non-critical inputs.
25 industries are rated to be non-critical inputs to other industries in 80% of all cases, with
Household Activities (T) and Manufacture of Furniture (C31-32) being rated as non-critical
in at least 96%. Industries like Other Services (R-S), Other Professional, Scientific and Tech-
nical Activities (M74-75) and Administrative Activities (N) rely on mostly non-critical inputs
(>90%).
A detailed breakdown of the input- and industry-specific ratings are given in Table 9.
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Input-based rankings Industry-based rankings
ISIC Sector (abbreviated) 1 0.5 0 NA 1 0.5 0 NA n
A01 Agriculture 4 2 49 0 9 9 37 0 1
A02 Foresty 2 3 50 0 7 9 39 0 1
A03 Fishing 2 1 52 0 8 5 42 0 1
B Mining 7 1 47 0 9 2 44 0 3
C10-C12 Manuf. Food-Beverages 5 6 44 0 14 5 36 0 1
C13-C15 Manuf. Textiles 2 5 48 0 6 2 47 0 1
C16 Manuf. Wood 3 3 49 0 8 3 44 0 1
C17 Manuf. Paper 5 10 40 0 14 11 30 0 1
C18 Media print 3 6 46 0 6 3 46 0 1
C19 Manuf. Coke-Petroleum 18 4 33 0 15 6 33 2 1
C20 Manuf. Chemical 21 10 24 0 15 6 34 0 1
C21 Manuf. Pharmaceutical 2 2 51 0 9 17 25 7 1
C22 Manuf. Rubber-Plastics 11 7 37 0 14 5 36 0 1
C23 Manuf. Minerals 8 2 44 2 7 1 47 0 1
C24 Manuf. Metals-basic 8 2 45 0 12 7 36 0 3
C25 Manuf. Metals-fabricated 12 4 39 0 5 3 47 0 1
C26 Manuf. Electronic 10 7 38 0 14 10 31 0 1
C27 Manuf. Electric 7 6 42 0 13 9 33 0 1
C28 Manuf. Machinery 10 12 32 2 5 1 49 0 1
C29 Manuf. Vehicles 4 5 46 0 14 10 31 0 1
C30 Manuf. Transport-other 2 6 47 0 12 10 33 0 1
C31 C32 Manuf. Furniture 1 1 53 0 8 4 43 0 1
C33 Repair-Installation 17 9 29 0 8 2 45 0 1
D35 Electricity-Gas 31 3 21 0 10 5 40 0 1
E36 Water 19 3 33 0 4 5 46 0 1
E37-E39 Sewage 18 3 34 0 6 8 41 0 1
F Construction 5 3 47 0 14 9 32 0 1
G45 Vehicle trade 2 5 48 0 9 7 39 0 1
G46 Wholesale 19 3 33 0 4 25 26 0 1
G47 Retail 2 3 50 0 6 10 39 0 1
H49 Land transport 28 3 24 0 11 2 42 0 1
H50 Water transport 9 8 38 0 8 5 42 0 1
H51 Air transport 5 7 43 0 10 6 39 0 1
H52 Warehousing 12 9 34 0 9 7 39 0 1
H53 Postal 6 7 41 2 3 5 47 0 1
I Accommodation-Food 5 3 47 0 7 6 42 0 1
J58 Publishing 1 2 52 0 10 14 31 0 1
J59 J60 Video-Sound-Broadcasting 2 2 51 0 9 5 37 7 1
J61 Telecommunications 26 11 18 0 7 5 42 2 1
J62 J63 IT 16 13 26 0 7 6 42 0 1
K64 Finance 10 19 26 0 6 3 46 0 1
K65 Insurance 6 12 36 2 6 3 46 0 1
K66 Auxil. Finance-Insurance 5 7 41 4 6 4 45 0 1
L68 Real estate 1 3 51 0 7 5 43 0 1
M69 M70 Legal 12 15 28 0 5 3 46 2 1
M71 Architecture-Engineering 6 10 39 0 4 2 49 0 1
M72 R&D 1 2 52 0 4 3 48 0 1
M73 Advertising 1 7 47 0 5 2 48 0 1
M74 M75 Other Science 1 8 46 0 4 1 50 0 1
N Private Administration 16 16 23 0 3 2 50 0 1
O84 Public Administration 6 3 45 2 5 2 48 0 1
P85 Education 1 4 50 0 6 8 41 0 1
Q Health 1 6 48 0 7 7 41 0 1
R S Other Service 1 1 50 5 4 0 51 0 1
T Household activities 0 0 54 2 0 0 55 0 0
Table 9: Summary table of critical input ratings by IHS Markit analysts. Columns below Input-based rankings
show how often an industry has been rated as critical (score=1), half-critical (score=0.5) or non-critical (score=0)
input for other industries, or how often the input was rates as NA. Columns under Industry-based rankings give
how often an input has been rated as with 1, 0.5, 0 or NA for any given industry. Column n indicates the number
of analysts who have rated the inputs of any given industry. Industry T uses no inputs and is therefore not rated.
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D Sensitivity analysis
In this appendix we perform sensitivity analysis of the economic model with respect to both
supply and demand shocks (Appendices D.1 and D.2) and model parameters and assumptions
(Appendices D.3 and D.4). For the latter, we follow a one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis approach
(Borgonovo & Plischke 2016), in the sense that we start from the baseline scenario described
in the main text and vary some assumptions while holding all other assumptions fixed to the
baseline scenario (see Table 10). Further, in Appendix D.5 we show how the various scenarios
compare in terms of matching sectoral unemployment data from the U.S. states of Washington
and Texas, see Section 4. Finally, in Appendix D.6, we compare our model results to those of
traditional input-output models, namely the Leontief and Gosh models.
Scenario names τ production function hiring-firing γH γF cons. function
baseline τ = 10 Leontief, important inputs non-critical yes 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
τ = 1 τ = 1 Leontief, important inputs non-critical yes 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
τ = 5 τ = 5 Leontief, important inputs non-critical yes 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
τ = 15 τ = 15 Leontief, important inputs non-critical yes 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
τ = 20 τ = 20 Leontief, important inputs non-critical yes 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
linear τ = 10 linear yes 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
leontief τ = 10 Leontief yes 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
important inputs critical τ = 10 Leontief, important inputs critical yes 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
important inputs half-critical τ = 10 Leontief, important inputs half-critical yes 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
no hiring-firing τ = 10 Leontief, important inputs non-critical no 0.03 0.07 muellbauer
fast labor adjustment τ = 10 Leontief, important inputs non-critical yes 0.50 1.00 muellbauer
slow labor adjustment τ = 10 Leontief, important inputs non-critical yes 0.01 0.02 muellbauer
fixed consumption τ = 10 Leontief, important inputs non-critical yes 0.03 0.07 fixed
keynesian consumption τ = 10 Leontief, important inputs non-critical yes 0.03 0.07 keynesian
Table 10: Scenarios for model parameters and assumptions considered in this sensitivity analysis. See Sections
Sections D.3 and D.4 for a more detailed description of the various specifications.
D.1 First-order shocks uncertainty
Since there is substantial uncertainties in first-order shocks discussed in Section 3.5, we test
how sensitive model results are with respect to the shock initialisation considered in the main
text. To do this, we first randomly perturb the supply and demand shocks for every industry.
More specifically, we create perturbed supply and demand shock vectors by letting
¯Si,0 = 
S
i,0(1 + ψ
S
i ), (47)
and
¯Di,0 = 
D
i,0(1 + ψ
D
i ), (48)
where ψSi , ψ
D
i ∼ N(0, σ). We use different values for standard deviation, σ ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.2},
representing a normal randomization of original values by 1-20% standard deviations. We then
initialise the model with the perturbed first-order shocks and run the lockdown simulations.
We repeat this procedure 1,000 times and report median values, interquartile range (IQR) and
the 95% confidence bounds of aggregate output values. We did not investigate perturbing other
final demand fdi,0.
The upper left panel of Fig. 17 presents the result of this analysis. Since results are
qualitatively very similar for the explored standard deviation specifications, we only show the
largest perturbation case with σ = 0.2. First note that the default model result (red line) follows
very closely the median result (black line). Also, the IQR is only a narrow band around the
reported default values. These results are reassuring as they indicate strong robustness of the
model result against uncertainty in initial shock values for a large range of simulations. This
picture changes when considering the 95% confidence bounds instead. Here, the ribbon expands
dramatically towards small values after around 110 time steps. This finding suggests that for a
certain range of initial shocks our model would predict a substantial collapse of the economy.
55
Since we do not observe similar nonlinearities for the IQR, this initial shock arrangement is not
particularly likely given our estimates represent reasonable expected values of the “true” shocks.
Also, the economic collapse happens only after almost four months of lockdown, a much longer
time horizon as considered in the simulations for the main results. Nevertheless, the results
emphasizes the importance of nonlinearities in the economic system by demonstrating how
related initial economic shocks can be amplified in very different ways.
The upper right and lower panels of Fig. 17 show the same simulations but using exclusively
perturbations on the supply and demand side, respectively. It is immediately evident that the
large confidence bounds after four months of lockdown are driven by the supply side shock
uncertainty. When perturbing only demand shocks and setting supply shocks to the default
values (lower panel), there is very little variance in our model prediction.
D.2 Economic impact of supply and demand shocks
We repeat the analysis in Section 5.2 of running model simulations with only parts of the initial
shocks being switched on for alternative production function specifications. In the left and
right panels of Fig. 16 we show simulation results for Leontief and linear production functions,
respectively. We find for all production functions that supply shocks are substantially more
severe than demand shocks, in particular for Leontief production.
For the Leontief production model, economic impacts on gross output are almost identical
for the supply-shocks-only and baseline scenarios. There is a slightly less realized consumption
when having only supply shocks present compared to both supply and demand shocks being
switched on.
In the case of linear production functions there is a clearer ordering of how severe demand,
supply and both shocks together impact overall economic performance. Here, impacts on gross
output are smaller if only supply shocks are considered compared to the baseline case where
both demand and supply shocks are switched on. This makes sense since there are no input
bottlenecks in this case, making higher competition for given production levels less problematic.
Nevertheless, realized final consumption is also smaller for the linear production model if only
supply shocks are considered.
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Figure 16: Dynamic effect of supply shocks vs. demand shocks for different production functions.
As Fig. 8, but using Leontief (left panels) and linear (right panels) production functions. Normalized values of
gross output (upper panels) and realized consumption (lower panels) for different shock scenarios. Baseline (red)
denotes the model default setup where both supply and demand shocks are used. The blue/black line shows the
case where only demand/supply shocks are switched on. The lockdown starts at t = 0 and ends for all industries
after two months at t = 60.
D.3 Production function
We re-run the same simulations as in Section 5.1, but now open all industries after two months of
lockdown to also compare recovery paths between different production function specifications.
Fig. 18 shows the results of these simulations where the lockdown ends at t = 62 (vertical
dashed line). We find that after six months the five recovery paths converge for different
production function specifications, although the transient looks very different for an extended
period of time. Note that the economy does not fully recover after six months due to the slow
rebouncing of pessimistic consumer expectations consumers and persistence of shocks in exports
and investments (see Section 3.5).
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Figure 17: Impact of uncertainty in first-order shocks. Upper left panel: Perturbing initial supply and
demand shocks. Upper right panel: Perturbing only supply shocks. Lower panel: Perturbing only demand shocks.
The red line is the default model run reported in the main text, the black line the median of all 1,000 model runs
with perturbed initial shock vectors. Green indicates the 95% quantile and blue the interquartile range.
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Figure 18: Recovery from the lockdown for four different production functions. The same as Fig. 6,
but here the lockdown ends at t = 62.
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D.4 Sensitivity analysis of model parameters
To better understand how results are affected by particular model parameter choices, we conduct
a series of sensitivity tests. We make ‘local’ sensitivity tests, meaning that we take the default
model setup and then vary a set of parameter to investigate how simulation results are affected.
We first present sensitivity tests on inventory adjustment parameter τ which plays an im-
portant role in intermediate demand; Eq. (8). Note that a small τ represents quick adjustment
behavior where firms aim to replenish run-down inventories essentially within a day. On the
other hand, if τ is large, firms react slowly to changes in their input inventories, even when at
risk of facing input bottlenecks.
We see in Fig. 19 how aggregate economic outcomes depend on parameter τ . We find that
small values of τ , representing highly responsive firms, dampen adverse economic impacts, while
negative impacts are larger if we assume higher sluggishness.
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Figure 19: Model results for different choices of the inventory adjustment speed parameter τ . The baseline case
is τ = 10.
We also make sensitivity tests with respect to different consumption functions. We test
following specifications. First, we use the default consumption function inspired by Muellbauer
(2020) which is discussed in detail in Section 3.3. As alternative we also consider a simpler
consumption function where consumers demand simply a fixed portion of their current income
(i.e. have a fixed marginal propensity to consume) which for brevity we call “Keynesian”
consumption function. As an even simpler specification we also consider a fixed consumption
function where consumers demand a fixed portion of their initial income. For the two alternative
consumption functions we choose marginal propensities to consume equal to one such that all
of present or initial income is consumed.
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Figure 20: Model results for different consumption functions. The default case is “Muellbauer 2020”.
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Figure 21: The effect of hiring and firing speed, γH and γF , on model results. The default case is γH = 1/30. In
all simulations we used γF = 2γH .
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Model results for alternative consumption function specifications are shown in Fig. 20. There
are only negligible differences between different production functions on gross output and labor
compensation. Realized consumption is slightly higher for a fixed consumption function which
is not surprising and somewhat artificially achieved since here consumers demand based on
comparatively large initial income values.
We also investigate how model results depend on the speed of adjustment in labor inputs. In
Section 3.3 we introduced a parameter γH which represents how quickly firms can hire employees
in case they want to ramp up their productive capacities. Values of γH close to one represent
the case where hiring can happen very quickly, whereas values close to zero indicate that it is
very hard for firms to hire new workers. Similarly, we considered an equivalent parameter γF
for firing workers.
In Fig. 21 we show how model results are affected if different γH values are used as well as
if hiring and firing are completely ruled out. All these simulations use γF = 2γH to reflect the
situation where firing of employees takes less them than hiring if allowed. We find almost no
differences on gross output and realized consumption for all these cases. In line with intuition
the exact specification of hiring and firing affects labor compensation and firms’ profits. In
case of no hiring and firing, labor compensation remains constant throughout the simulation,
once the initial labor supply shock is applied. Labor compensation is smaller the easier it
is for firms to fire (and hire) employees. This makes sense since firms which face production
constraints other than capacity constraints will lay off employees, reducing overall labor income.
The picture is reversed for profits. If there is no flexibility for firms in adjusting labor input,
there is a larger negative impact on profits. The easier firms can lay off workers, the more they
reduce costs on labor which they do not need to satisfy aggregate demand.
D.5 Sensitivity of comparison to empirical data
In Section 4, we compared model predictions to data coming from the U.S. states of Washington
and Texas, when running the model in the baseline scenario. In this section, we consider the
other scenarios outlined in Table 10 and described in the previous appendices. We do not find
much difference in terms of the relative performance of each scenario when either comparing to
Washington or Texas, or using the Pearson or weighted correlation coefficients. We thus report
in Fig. 22 only results for Washington, using a weighted correlation coefficient to compare
model predictions and empirical data.
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Figure 22: For various scenarios, we show the weighted correlation coefficient between model predictions for
rises in unemployment in various sectors and empirical data coming from Washington State. See Table 10 for a
definition of the various scenarios.
It is immediately apparent that the performance of the various scenarios is similar, except
for the cases of the basic Leontief production function and of the Leontief production function
with important inputs considered as critical or half-critical. In these cases, and especially in
the Leontief case, performance is substantially lower, suggesting that our modeling choice of
distinguishing between critical and non-critical inputs adds realism to our model. Correlation
between model predictions and empirical data is somewhat lower in case no hiring or firing
takes place (in the sense that workers are only furloughed due to the epidemic shock and not
due to second-order effects), but this is a clearly unrealistic assumption. Given the combined
uncertainties of comparing the model to the data, and the intrinsic uncertainty in these prelim-
inary data, it would not be wise to select an unrealistic assumption based on a small increase
in empirical performance.
Therefore, our choice of the baseline reflects a balance between ability to reproduce empirical
patterns and prior belief in certain assumptions/parameter values. We use poor empirical
performance to exclude the Leontief, “important inputs critical” and “important inputs half-
critical” scenarios. We use instead our best judgement to exclude too fast or slow adjustments of
inventories and labor force, full substitution of inputs in the linear production function, and too
simple consumption functions such as the fixed or “Keynesian” ones. As shown in Appendices
D.3 and D.4, in any case, model results tend to depend weakly on these specific assumptions,
consistently with the little ability of data to distinguish between the respective scenarios.
D.6 Comparison to traditional IO models
We also compare our model results to traditional input-output (IO) models. In particular, we
compare the steady state of our model with two models, the demand-driven Leontief (Leontief
1936) and the supply-driven Gosh model (Ghosh 1958). Since these simpler IO models do not
include inventory effects, we set input inventories artificially high such that they do not restrict
economic production.
In the Leontief model final demand is exogenous, and under the assumption of fixed pro-
duction recipes, gross output per industry is endogenously determined by multiplying demand
with the Leontief inverse (Miller & Blair 2009). When considering only demand shocks, we can
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write the Leontief prediction as
xL = (I−A)−1(cshocked + f shocked). (49)
We also rerun our model with all supply shocks being switched off and only considering demand
shocks. We then compare the steady state results of our model with the Leontief prediction.
Fig. 23 (left panel) shows the reduction of sectoral gross output compared to the pre-
shock state as barplots for our and the Leontief model. We find that our model very closely
recovers the Leontief prediction in the steady state. Gross output per industry in the steady
state of our model and the Leontief model have almost a correlation of one. The differences
between predicted sectoral reductions in gross output are almost zero in all cases. Only for
Health (Q) they differ by 2.3%, since the Leontief model would predict an increase as a result of
positive demand shocks which cannot be satisfied in our model due to fixed maximum capacity
constraints.
These results are very robust against using empirical inventories. It should be noted that
the Leontief model is static and we are comparing the steady state of our dynamic model. Thus,
modeling the transient which is relevant for the short time-scales considered in the main text
is not possible with the traditional Leontief model.
We do a similar comparison with the supply-driven Gosh model. There are no fixed pro-
duction recipes in the Gosh model, but fixed “allocation coefficients” Bij = Zij,0/xi,0. Here, a
change in gross output is due to a change in primary inputs, i.e. represented as value added.
In the notation used here we can formulate the Gosh prediction as
xG = (I−B>)−1(lshocked + e). (50)
We plot the Gosh predictions and the steady state results of our model with only supply
shocks turned on in the right panel of Fig. 23. We find greater differences between the Gosh
and our model for the supply shocks. This should not come as a surprise, since the Gosh model
builds upon a very different production function.
Rankings of sectoral declines are still very correlated (Spearman correlation of 0.91). This
is higher than the correlations between our model’s steady state rankings of industries and the
initial shock rankings (correlation of 0.87). Unsurprisingly, the Gosh model rankings are most
similar as the ones obtained from using initial supply shocks only (correlation of 0.94).
These results are not very robust with respect to the specifications of the economic model
considered here. Using empirical inventories in our model enlarges differences in model predic-
tions tremendously.
We compared our model also to slightly more complex mixed endogenous/exogenous IO
models (Dietzenbacher & Miller 2015, Arto et al. 2015) which simultaneously can take supply
and demand shocks into account. Yet these models do not always guarantee positive solutions for
variables such gross output and final consumption (Miller & Blair 2009, p.628). In particular
when applying the large first-order supply and demand shocks of the pandemic to the UK
economy, the mixed IO model does not yield feasible allocations.
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Figure 23: Comparison between impacts on sectoral gross output obtained from traditional IO models with our
model. The left panel compares the model steady state with the Leontief (only demand shocks are switched on),
the right panel with the Gosh model (only supply shocks are switched on). Note that our model was run with
artificially high inventories, no hiring and firing, ∆s = 1 and no income losses (b = 1).
E Epidemic modelling
In this appendix we present our epidemic model where we divide contagion channels by activities.
As we focus on the early stage of the epidemic, we do not explicitly model the number of
recovered individuals R, although that plays a role to determine the total population M . We
start denoting the number of susceptible and infected people in the pupils and students and in
the non-working adults category by Ss, Is, Su, Iu respectively. Similarly, Si and Ii denote the
number of susceptible and infected workers of industry i. It follows that the decrease in the
overall susceptible population S is given by
dS
dt
=
dSs
dt
+
dSu
dt
+
N∑
i=1
dSi
dt
. (51)
In what follows, we compute the rate of infection of each population category by focusing on
the different channels of contagion each person is exposed to. In these computations we assume
homogeneous mixing of the population, meaning that the probability that a person had contact
with an individual that was infected is IM , regardless on the channel they had contact in.
Normalizing contact-weighted shares by population As we discuss in Appendix F we
have data on the share of intensity-weighted contacts in each activity of the overall popula-
tion. For the derivation of the epidemiological model it is useful to renormalize these shares of
weighted contacts (i.e. the β’s) by the population they come from. This is not necessary for
βc(0) or βh(0), since consumption and other household interaction related contacts are spread
evenly across the whole population. On the contrary, we do need to renormalize βs(0) by the
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student and pupil population ηs, so that
βˆs(0) =
βs(0)
ηs
. (52)
Another way to look at the equation above is to note that βˆs(0) is the share of intensity-weighted
contacts in school per unit population, and to obtain the actual share of intensity-weighted
contacts βs(0) one needs to multiply βˆs(0) by the population share of students, ηs. Similarly,
we renormalize the work intensity-contacts across the workers of different industries as follows
βˆw(0) =
βw(0)∑N
l=1 ηlbl,w
, (53)
where the normalization includes the bi,w factors i.e., the heterogenous distribution of intensity-
weighted contacts across industries.
In the transport channel, we must distribute the contacts across the commuter population
(i.e. workers and students). To account for a density effect (see below), we assume that the
number of contacts scales with the square of the number of people in public transport, and use
the normalization factor
βˆT (0) =
βT (0)(
ηs +
∑N
i=1 ηi
)2 , (54)
where ηs +
∑N
i=1 ηi is the pre-lockdown share of the population that commutes.
Students and pupils To simplify notation we define µs as the fraction of the students and
pupils population attending schools, which is given by
µs =
δs + (1− δs)
g N∑
j=1
δi,wηi
 .
We know that students and pupils are exposed to infection due to school attendance, transport,
consumption, and other household interaction. We assume that pupils that go to school have
the same amount of contacts in school as before lockdown25, while for transport we consider
that the number of contacts decreases due to the reduced density of people in the bus/train.
With these assumptions we obtain the following equation for the infection rate
dSs
dt
= −β∗
[
βˆs(0)µ
sSs
I
M
+ βˆT (0)µ
sSs
(
µs
Is
M
+
N∑
k=1
δk,w
Ik
M
)
+ βc(0)S
s I
M
N∑
k=1
δk(t)bk,c + βh(0)S
s I
M
((1− δh)κ+ δh)
]
, (55)
where the first two terms correspond to the infections happening at school and transport and
thus only apply to the fraction µs of the student population that goes to school. The third
and fourth term correspond to infections happening while consuming or doing other household
activities and therefore apply to the whole student population. bk,c is the consumption related
contacts, while κ is the share of social/family/friends contacts that are not avoidable by social
25 We make this assumption considering that a) only certain schools are open so it is unclear to what extent
the density in schools has decreased b) it is possible that pupils interact more with the few pupils left in school
and thus the number of contacts can remain roughly constant.
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distancing. Notice that since transport is shared with both students and workers, the transport
term includes both Is and Ik. The fact that we are considering the fractions µ
s and δk,w of
infected in the transport term reflects our assumption that density matters in particular in
transports; note, for example, that we are not multiplying infected individuals by µs in the
school term.
We simplify the above equation using the mean field approximation Si ≈ ηiS, Ii ≈ ηiI,
Ss ≈ ηsS, and Is ≈ ηsI and obtain
dSs
dt
= −β
∗
M
SI
[
βˆs(0)µ
sηs + βˆT (0)
(
(ηsµs)2 + ηsµs
N∑
k=1
δk,wηk
)
+ βc(0)η
s
N∑
k=1
δk(t)bk,c + βh(0)η
s ((1− δh)κ+ δh)
]
. (56)
Working population Workers are exposed to infection due to work, transport, consumption,
and other household interaction. For a worker in industry i, the infection rate is
dSi
dt
= −β∗
[
βˆw(0)δi,wSibi,w
I
M
+ βˆT (0)Siδi,w
(
µs
Is
M
+
N∑
k=1
δk,w
Ik
M
)
+ βc(0)Si
I
M
N∑
k=1
δk(t)bk,c + βh(0)Si
I
M
((1− δh)κ+ δh)
]
, (57)
where we have assumed that workers that go to work make the same amount of contacts at
work as before lockdown, while for transport we consider that the number of contacts decreases
due to the reduced density of people in public transport. We have made explicit that the work
and transport infection channels only apply to the fraction δi,w of the working population in i
going to work and to the µs fraction of students going to school. As before, we use the mean
field approximation Si ≈ ηiS, Ii ≈ ηiI, Ss ≈ ηsS, and Is ≈ ηsI to simplify the equation to
dSi
dt
= −β
∗
M
SI
[
βˆw(0)δi,wηibi,w + βˆT (0)ηiδi,w
(
µsηs +
N∑
k=1
δk,wηk
)
+ βc(0)ηi
N∑
k=1
δk(t)bk,c + βh(0)ηi ((1− δh)κ+ δh)
]
. (58)
We now sum across all N industries to obtain
N∑
i=1
dSi
dt
= −β
∗
M
SI
[
βˆw(0)
N∑
i=1
δi,wηibi,w + βˆT (0)
µsηs N∑
i=1
δi,wηi +
(
N∑
i=1
δi,wηi
)2
+ βc(0)
N∑
i=1
ηi
N∑
k=1
δk(t)bk,c + βh(0)
N∑
i=1
ηi ((1− δh)κ+ δh)
]
. (59)
Non-working adults By definition non-working adults are not exposed to the work or school
infection channel. Furthermore, since we only consider work-commuting transport use, the non-
working adults are not exposed to the transport infection channel either. It follows that the
decrease in the susceptible population depends only on the consumption and other household
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interaction channel
dSu
dt
= −β
∗
M
SI
[
βc(0)η
u
N∑
k=1
δk,c(t)bk,c + βh(0)η
u ((1− δh)κ+ δh) ,
]
(60)
where we have again used the approximation Su ≈ ηuS.
Total population To get the infection rate of the overall population we substitute Eqs.
(56)–(60) in equation Eq. (51). It follows that
dS
dt
= −β∗SI
M
[
βˆw(0)
N∑
i=1
δi,wηibi,w + βˆs(0)µ
sηs
+ βˆT (0)
(
µsηs +
N∑
i=1
ηiδi,w
)2
+ βc(0)
N∑
k=1
δk(t)bk,c + βh(0) ((1− δh)κ+ δh)
]
, (61)
where we have used the fact that ηs + ηu +
∑N
i=1 ηi = 1. The above terms correspond to
the infection due to work, school, transport, consumption, and other household interaction
respectively. We can write the above equation as
dS
dt
= −β(t)SI
M
(62)
where
β(t) = β∗
(
βw(t) + βs(t) + βc(t) + βT (t) + βh(t)
)
, (63)
which is Eq. (37) of the main text. The β’s are given by
βw(t) = βˆw(0)
N∑
i=1
δi,wηibi,w = βw(0)
N∑
i=1
δi,w
ηibi,w∑N
l=1 ηlbl,w
, (64)
βs(t) = βˆs(0)µ
sηs = βs(0)µ
s, (65)
βT (t) = βˆT (0)
(
µsηs +
N∑
i=1
ηiδi,w
)2
= βT (0)
(
µsηs +
∑N
i=1 ηiδi,w
ηs +
∑N
l=1 ηl
)2
, (66)
βc(t) = βc(0)
N∑
k=1
δk(t)bk,c, (67)
and
βh = βh(0) ((1− δh)κ+ δh) . (68)
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F Calibration of epidemic model
F.1 Literature review
In epidemiology, the main method to understand contact patterns is to use social contact
surveys. A landmark study is the Polymod study (Mossong et al. 2008). Several other studies
in the last decade have confirmed that, roughly speaking, people have about 10-20 non casual
contacts per day, mostly at home and at work. By “non-casual” contact, we mean contacts as
defined by these studies, that is, either physical contact or non physical contact defined as “a
two-way conversation with three or more words in the physical presence of another person”.
The Polymod study is very interesting for us because it reports where contacts take place.
Averaging across countries and pooling physical and non-physical contacts, 23%, 21%, 14%, 3%,
and 16% are made at home, at work, at school, while travelling, and during leisure activities,
respectively.
There are still significant uncertainties on the mode of transmission of SARS-CoV-2, and in
particular whether it can diffuse through casual contact (whether simply ‘sharing air’ is risky,
because aerosolized particles, rather than just droplets, are risky). Fortunately, there have also
been a couple of studies quantifying “casual” contacts, that is, contacts between anonymous
individuals but that nevertheless involve enough proximity to result in a transmission. Miko-
lajczyk & Kretzschmar (2008) report several studies where participants (students) were “asked
about aggregate numbers of contacts on six levels of proximity: intimate contacts, close contacts
(same household), direct conversation (> 2 min duration, max. 2 m distance), small group (with
conversations, but less intensive than in direct conversations), larger group (seminary or lecture
room) and occasional contacts (in the range of 2 m in local transportation, cinema, etc.).”
The number of conversational contacts (i.e. including intimate, close and direct conversation )
was sensibly below but in line with the Polymod study (6-13 contacts vs 10-20). Their Fig. 2
suggests that the number of contacts in small groups, large groups, and random contacts was
roughly speaking 8, 30 and 40, with variations depending on study design. Roughly speaking,
people have on average 10 close contacts per day but 80 casual (non-close) contacts.
A few studies have looked at social contact patterns to understand the diffusion of tuber-
culosis, which spreads very easily. Reading from their Fig. 3, the estimates of mean casual
contacts per day obtained by McCreesh et al. (2019) for South Africa are about 10 for trans-
port (combining trains and large taxis), 6 for school and work, 5 for shops (spaza shop, shebeen
and mall), 2 for home, and less than 2 for church and community hall. These estimates are for
the mean number of contacts per day, but McCreesh et al. (2019) also asked participants for
the number of casual contact present during the visit to a location (Fig. S2), showing about 40
casual contacts in Malls and Trains. In many other categories relating to transport or shopping,
the number of casual contacts is around 10-15.
In this paper, we use a study from Sweden (Stro¨mgren et al. 2017). The study reports, for
a variety of places, the likelihood that it is visited during an average day, the duration of the
visit26, the number of people present, and the likelihood of physical contact, see Table 11.
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Visit Duration Crowd Physical Intensity
Category Stromgren et al’s
category
Visit
likeli-
hood
Duration
(hours)
Median
number peo-
ple present
Likelihood
physical
contact
Weighted contacts
Work Work 21.20 7.60 20.00 55.80 0.29 0.29
School
Pre-school 8.60 7.60 20.00 73.30 0.12
0.28
School 12.00 7.60 20.00 71.10 0.16
Consume
Convenience store 5.20 0.40 10.00 8.30 0.00
0.16
Large store 24.10 0.80 21.50 18.00 0.04
Restaurant 9.40 1.40 30.00 30.80 0.04
Sports venue 11.50 2.30 34.50 53.80 0.08
Transport Public transport 16.30 1.00 40.00 8.30 0.06 0.06
Home
Home 95.00 18.40 1.00 73.70 0.16
0.21
Car 58.70 0.90 1.00 25.80 0.00
Public urban space 6.60 1.80 20.00 28.30 0.02
Friends and relatives 21.00 5.10 3.00 80.10 0.03
Table 11: The columns Duration and Crowd for the rows School and Pre-school are inferred from the equivalent
number in the row Work. “Large store” is short for “Large and specialist store”. The source of raw data is
Stro¨mgren et al. (2017). Intensity-weighted contacts are our own calculations, see text. The last column shows
the values calculated for Table 3, Eq.s (37)-(38) in the main text.
F.2 Calibration
We used the data from Table 11 to create an intensity-weighted number of contacts. We define
for each of the 12 places27.
Intensityi =
Visiti ×Durationi × Crowdi∑12
j=1
[
Visitj ×Durationj × Crowdj
] (69)
To compute the values in Table 3 for Eqs. (37)-(38), we sum-up the relevant Intensity variables.
Work. To calibrate biw, we create an index based on the physical proximity and exposure to
infection index of each industry, which, as explained in Appendix A, we map from O’NET data.
At the occupation level, physical proximity and exposure to infection range from 0 to 100 and
are described as follows.
• Exposure to disease and infection. O*NET assigns a score to each occupation depending on
the frequency with which workers in that occupation are exposed to disease and infection
in normal times. The scale runs from 0, indicating that the worker is never exposed to
100, indicating that the worker is exposed every day. It is important to consider that this
rating was done before the pandemic, and doesn’t seem to properly take into account the
properties of COVID-19
26 The duration of shop visits is highly consistent with the data reported by Goldfarb & Tucker (2020), who
use mobile phone data for the US and report an average visit of 22 to 42 minutes across 11 categories of retail
shops.
27 Note that we could have used the variable showing the likelihood of physical contact as proxy for the closeness
of contact, as an additional factor in Eq. (69). We have done so in a robustness check and most results are similar,
except for Sports Venue which becomes an even larger share of all consumption risks. We decided against using
this additional variable in the current draft as we match this activity with the industry that contains cinemas,
theatres, religious gatherings, etc. It is true that, like sports, these activities have a significant duration, but they
are not as likely to involve physical contact.
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Figure 24: COVID-19 relative infection risk of industries. This index is constructed by taking the average
of the exposure to infection and the physical proximity index of industries and then normalizing so that they
sum up to one.
• Physical proximity. O*NET also considers to what extent performing job tasks requires
physical proximity. A score of 75 implies being moderately close (at arm’s length) and
100 implies near touching.
To obtain a score at the industry level, we aggregate occupation-level scores using employment
data from the BLS, which indicates the occupational composition of each industry and then
map into the WIOD classification (see Appendix A for details). Our industry-specific infection
risk is the average of physical proximity and exposure to infection. That is
biw =
1
2
(exposure to infectioni + physical proximityi). (70)
Consumption. We consider that, from Table 11, there are three types of consumption ac-
tivities: Shopping (Convenience stores and Large stores), Restaurants, and Sports Venue. We
then map these into the WIOD but looking at the list of industries (Table 5) and assuming that
all Shopping activity comes from the WIOD industry G47: Retail ; that all Restaurant activity
comes from the Industry I:Accomodation-Food ; and all Sports Venue activity comes from the
Other Services activity.
Transport. We consider the value from Table 11. We note that Stro¨mgren et al. (2017)
observe an important divide between rural and urban places in terms of time spent in public
transports.
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Home-related. In the main text, we need to consider the impact of social distancing measures
on βh, the share of contacts that are unrelated to whether industries are open or not. We
assume that during lockdown, the number of contacts at home stay the same, but the number
of contacts with Friends and Relatives, within a family car, or in public urban spaces fall
to zero. Since Home is responsible for 76% (16/21) of the home related contacts, we take
betah(lockdown) = βh(t = 0) ∗ 0.7.
Population data. To obtain the share of population in the special industries Schools and Out-
of-the-labor-force, we use the ONS Current Population Survey 28 According to these surveys 62%
of the population is employed and 23% of the population is between 0-19 years old. Therefore,
we assign 62% of the population to the i = 1, ...,M − 2 working industries, 23% to the school
industry29 and the rest to the retired industry (unemployed and all inactive are thus assigned
into this industry). From the 62% of the working population we assign them to the i =
1, ...,M − 2 working industries according to the shares of employment calculated from the
WIOD employment data. Finally, again using the ONS CPS, we compute that the share of
0-19 year old who are 14 or below is g = 17/23.
28 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/
populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland
29 We assume that all people between 0-19 years old go to school.
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G Notation
Symbol Name
N Number of industries
t Time index
tstart lockdown Start date of lockdown
tend lockdown End date of lockdown
tend pandemic End date of pandemic
xi,t Gross output of industry i
Zij,t Intermediate consumption of good i by industry j
ci,t Household consumption of good i
cdi,t Demand of household consumption of good i
fi,t Non-household final demand of good i
fdi,t Demand non-household final demand of good i
li,t Labor compensation to workers of industry i
pii,t Profits of industry i
ei,t “All other” (non intermediates or labor) expenses of industry i
l˜t, c˜t, p˜it , x˜t Total labor compensation, consumption, profits and output
di,t Total demand for industry i
Oij,t Orders (demand from industry j to industry i)
nj Number of days of targeted inventory for industry j
Ai,j Payments to i per unit produced of j (technical coefficients)
Sij,t Stock of material i held in j’s inventory
τ Speed of inventory adjustment
θi,t share of goods from industry i in consumption demand
θ¯i,t share of goods from industry i in consumption demand (unnormalized)
c˜dt Aggregate consumption demand
ρ speed of adjustment of aggregate consumption
t consumption exogenous shock
l˜pt expectations for permanent labor income
m share of labor income used to consume final domestic goods
ξt fraction of pre-pandemic labor income that households expect to retain in the long-run
ξLt fraction of pre-pandemic labor income that households expect to retain in the long-run during
the lockdown
xcapi,t industry production capacity based on available labor
xinpi,t industry production capacity based on available inputs
˜Si,t exogenous supply shock to industry i
˜Di relative changes in demand for goods of industry i during lockdown
˜i,t relative changes in demand for goods of industry i
˜t aggregate consumption shock
∆li,t desired change of labor supply of industry i
lmaxi,t maximum labor supply for industry i
γH, γF Speed of upward/downward labor adjustment (hiring/firing)
∆s Change in saving rate
l˜∗t Household income including social benefits
Table 12: Notation for the Economic model
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Symbol Name
Ss, Su, Si Number of Susceptible individuals in the student, adult non-working, and working population
Is, Iu, Ii Number of Infected individuals in the student, adult non-working, and working population
S = Ss + Su + Si Number of Susceptible individuals
I = Is + Iu + Ii Number of Infected individuals
R Number of Recovered individuals
M = (S + I +R) Number of individuals in the population
β∗ Force of infection
γ Recovery rate
R0 Reproduction number
ηs, ηu, ηi Share of people in the student category, the adult non-working category and in industry i
µs Share of the student population that attends school
βw Share of intensity-weighted contacts at work
βs Share of intensity-weighted contacts in schools
βc Share of intensity-weighted contacts in consumption
βT Share of intensity-weighted contacts in transports
βh Share of intensity-weighted contacts at home
Table 13: Notation for the Epidemic model
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